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ABSTRACT 
Since the inception of modern police organizations, the police have been on the front 
lines of counter terrorism operations. The changing concept of terrorism into a more 
“transnational” nature has driven police organizations to devise new means to counter 
this challenge. International police cooperation on countering transnational terrorism is 
the product of this evolution. 
There have been several initiatives to build a competent and effective 
international police cooperation organization to fight against transnational terrorism, and 
new ones are steadily proposed by different stakeholders in the international arena. 
Without understanding what makes an international police cooperation organization 
effective in countering transnational terrorism, these initiatives will only yield to further 
duplication of efforts, waste of resources, and a steep decrease in the overall performance 
of those organizations. 
This project analyzes four international police cooperation organizations using the 
level of structural relations within the organization and geographic proximity as the 
independent variables. The cases are evaluated based on the performance of these 
organizations in achieving three organizational functions: information exchange, ad hoc 
assistance and capacity building, and policy coordination and contracting.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION ON COUNTERING 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
The world has been struggling with the menace of terrorism for almost 250 years 
and police forces have always been an important stakeholder in this struggle. Against 
domestic terrorist groups, national police forces have led the counterterrorism effort,1 but 
against transnational terrorist groups, police cooperation is critical, yet has often fallen 
victim to interstate and bureaucratic politics and cultures.2 
To better counter transnational crime and terrorism, international police agencies 
began to cooperate with each other by forming International Police Cooperation 
Organizations (IPCOs).3 Beginning in the 1890s, police officials attempted to build 
collaborative bodies to address emerging subversive movements all over the world.4 Like 
terrorist groups, some IPCOs have been organized in a relatively bottom-up fashion, 
trying to adapt to the changing environment through connections, networks, and mutual 
adjustment. Connections have been maintained and sustained on the premises of mutual 
trust, national interests and organizational efficiency.5 Police officials have utilized, 
especially in the last two decades, informal communication channels such as phone calls, 
                                                 
1 B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, “The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 173, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045106. 
2 Defining Terrorism, WP 3, Deliverable 4 (Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law 
(TTSRL), 2008), 70 –71, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf. 
William L. Waugh distinguishes transnational terrorism into three groups: (1) spillover terrorism (non-
citizen targets and perpetrators in relation to the locale), (2) integrated internal terrorism (either perpetrators 
or the victims are local), and (3) external terrorism (perpetrators reside outside the territory of the target 
country). 
3 The first known international police cooperation initiative was launched in 1851 under the name 
Police Union of German States. 
4 Nadia Gerspacher, “The History of International Police Cooperation: a 150-Year Evolution in Trends 
and Approaches,” Global Crime 9, no. 1 (2008): 172, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=29435067&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
5 Mathieu Deflem, “Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police 
Cooperation and Counterterrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 603, 
no. , Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (2006): 244, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097769. 
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fax, and e-mail messages. In some cases, direct correspondences between agencies that 
sidestep official diplomatic channels have had great effect. Electronic investigative 
databases and police liaison posts have facilitated these peer-to-peer relations.6 
Even though the importance of international police cooperation to counter 
transnational terrorism is apparently understood by many policy makers and law 
enforcement practitioners, it is difficult to state that there is a consensus on the principles 
of creating effective and efficient IPCOs to fight against transnational terrorism. 
Universal well-intended initiatives to build such international structures have yielded 
either insufficient and ineffective outcomes or overlapping and complicated 
implementations. The already complicated and cumbersome methodologies became even 
worse with the increasing number of IPCOs or special bureaus that were established 
under the roof of international political agencies to coordinate and enhance international 
law enforcement cooperation in the last two decades of the twentieth century. With this 
perspective, the main research question that this project attempts to scrutinize is what 
makes an effective international police cooperation organization to counter terrorism. 
Measuring the absolute effectiveness of IPCOs is a daunting task. The heightened 
controls on the disclosure of personal and operational information put significant 
limitations on the available data. In addition to that, neither IPCOs nor other unclassified 
resources are keen to announce the number of arrests and/or disrupted terrorist 
organizations as a result of international cooperation. Although this kind of information 
would be quite useful to make comparisons between the effectiveness of IPCOs, only a 
few IPCOs share this kind of information with the public and the available data is 
inadequate to run comparative analyses. Notwithstanding that, the data on exchanged 
messages is insufficient to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of these organizations.7 
                                                 
6 Ersel Aydinli and Hasan Yon, “Transgovernmentalism Meets Security: Police Liaison Officers, 
Terrorism, and Statist Transnationalism,” Governance 24, no. 1 (2011): 55–84, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2010.01512.x. 
7 Nadia Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational 
Crime: A Study of Institutional Effectiveness” (Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Chicago, 
2002), 9. 
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Therefore, this thesis intends to gauge the effectiveness of IPCOs by adopting an 
indirect methodology that has been also favored in some similar scholarly studies.8 In 
that indirect methodology, the author analyzes the accomplishments of IPCOs in carrying 
out their fundamental organizational functions. These functions have emerged either by 
design or as an evolutionary consequence of organizational necessity and aptness. 
According to the literature, IPCOs have primarily three distinctive functions: (1) 
information exchange, (2) contracting and policy coordination, and (3) ad hoc assistance 
and capacity building.9 The author concludes that the levels of effectiveness of the IPCOs 
vary due to the fact that some are more successful than others in operationalizing these 
three functions. 
These three functions matter because they can help national law enforcement 
agencies improve their three fundamental power sources against transnational terrorism. 
Information exchange activities aid police and other law enforcement agencies in gaining 
the information advantage over terrorist groups. The information advantage is the key 
element that exists in the core of counter terrorism and/or counter insurgency strategies.10 
Capacity building and ad hoc assistance activities improve the material resources and 
organizational know-how of the national agencies against transnational terrorism. 
Moreover, ad hoc assistance provided by the IPCOs alleviates the pressure on the 
                                                 
8 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness”; Max-Peter Ratzel, “EUROPOL in the Combat of International 
Terrorism,” in Understanding and Responding to Terrorism (Amsterdam, NLD: IOS Press, 2007), 11–16; 
Mathieu Deflem, “International Police Cooperation against Terrorism: INTERPOL and EUROPOL in 
Comparison,” in Understanding and Responding to Terrorism (Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007), 
17–26; Jennifer Hurst, “INTERPOL - Providing Support and Assistance to Combat International 
Terrorism,” in Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, ed. H. Durmaz, B. Sevinc, and A. S. Yayla 
(Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007), 3–10; Mathieu Deflem, “Bureaucratization and Social 
Control: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation,” Law & Society Review 34, no. 3 
(2000): pp. 739–778, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115142. 
9 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 9–11. 
10 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 327, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=24153028&site=ehost-live&scope=site; 
David J. Kilcullen, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Initiative., and U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Conference, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency”, 2006, 5, 
http://www.usgcoin.org/docs1/3PillarsOfCounterinsurgency.pdf. 
 4 
national agencies, especially in the wake of major events and/or in the aftermath of major 
terrorist attacks, and enable those national agencies to thoroughly focus, organize, and 
address security problems. Policy coordination and the contracting function of IPCOs 
provide a more coherent, robust, and internationally compatible law enforcement 
response to transnational terrorism. 
The author contends that two fundamental features of these organizations, namely 
the structural relations of the IPCOs and the geographic proximity of the constituent 
agencies, have decisive impacts on task accomplishment. In that regard, this study 
analyzes the effectiveness of the IPCOs on countering transnational terrorism (the 
dependent variable) as the collective achievement of the three said functions through the 
variations over structural relations and geographic proximity (the independent variables). 
The author codes the structural relations as considering transgovernmental relations on 
one end of the spectrum and intergovernmental relations on the other end. On the account 
of geographic proximity, the author divides the IPCOs in two groups based on their 
organizational structures as regional and global organizations. 
In its ideal form, a successful IPCO is expected to have open communication 
channels including both formalized, sophisticated digital networks and liaison officers 
working in close relationship with their counterparts. In terms of information exchange, 
providing timely and actionable intelligence and facilitating the exchange of best 
practices and professional information are two of the central utilities of those agencies. 
Since IPCOs are designed to undertake professional tasks rather than dealing with 
political problems, the organizations should be constructed on mutual trust and operate 
duly relying on professional virtues and voluntarily participation in addressing common 
problems. Moreover, an effective IPCO should be capable of providing technical and 
professional assistance to requesting law enforcement agencies. In order to achieve these 
functions, an effective IPCO is required to have a distinctive institutional identity while 
keeping its relevance and influential power on political authorities to convince them to 
adopt or modify legal regulations in the required areas.  
Building an international organization based on orthodox relationship structures is 
necessary but not sufficient. IPCOs should also be capable of responding to the 
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challenges that these organizations are initially aimed to address. In that regard, the 
author argues that the nature and operational features of transnational terrorism at the 
group level should also be evaluated. The international police cooperation agencies’ 
organizational features should be compatible with the targeted problem. According to the 
available data, transnational terrorism at the group level is a regional problem and thus, 
the solutions would be in a regional fashion. 
In this thesis, the author argues that the international collaborative police 
institutions may better achieve their fundamental tasks of countering transnational 
terrorism so long as they are constructed on transgovernmental relations and operate as 
regional networks. On one hand, transgovernmental relations would enable swift, 
accurate, and flexible information exchange while creating a strong sense of trust, 
professionalism, and fertile organizational climate for further cooperation. On the other 
hand, regionalization or geographic proximity may help them to work on symmetrically 
concerning problems and overcome linguistic, cultural, and logistical problems. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The three mentioned functions of the IPCOs are highly intertwined and mutually 
affect each other. In this section, the author intends to discuss the impacts of the selected 
independent variables on these three effectiveness indicators. 
In assessing information exchange capacities, this thesis researches if an IPCO 
has an information exchange structure. If the organization has managed to build such a 
mechanism, then this information exchange mechanism is analyzed whether it is an 
automated electronic system and/or a network of liaison officers. The contracting power 
and policy coordination capabilities are evaluated based on the scope of the binding 
power of their mandates and the legal/political mechanisms to adapt to the changing 
environment. Finally, ad hoc assistive and capacity building activities are analyzed over 
the direct technical assistance provided by the organization and deployed investigation 
and/or advisory teams in the requesting countries. 
Contemporary IPCOs can partially manifest all of these three features. For 
instance, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is relatively 
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successful on the capacity building and ad hoc assistance function whereas the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) lacks sophisticated electronic 
networks, databases, and dedicated contact bureaus working around the clock. On the 
other hand, owing to its 190 member countries, INTERPOL loses the benefits of a face-
to-face working human interface that is extremely helpful in expediting information 
exchange and tackling problems in coordination and communication. Although the 
European Union Police Office (EUROPOL) has these abovementioned dual information 
exchange interfaces, because of its limited mandate it engages in cooperation with 
different national/international agencies in other parts of the world to have a more robust 
and comprehensive database. Even though EUROPOL has considerably powerful binding 
power and enjoys political backing from the European Union (EU), political agendas of 
the states still have the upper hand in EUROPOL’s activities. This thesis will attempt to 
unearth the dynamics that make an IPCO relatively more successful in addressing 
transnational terrorism.11 
To understand why transgovernmental organizations are more effective than 
intergovernmental organizations at countering terrorism, one must consider the 
differences between these two kinds of organizations. Similarly, one must consider the 
difference between regional and global organizations. 
                                                 
11 Most studies on IPCOs do not differentiate transnational organized crime from transnational 
terrorism. Transnational crimes can be divided into two broad groups: politically sensitive and insensitive 
crimes. There is no doubt that international criminal activities threaten the international system, welfare, 
and security of nations. However, maintaining voluntary participation from states on countering politically 
sensitive crimes such as terrorism and hate crimes has always been difficult. Even today, the international 
community does not have a clear cut definition of terrorism. Moreover, politically sensitive crimes are 
usually perpetrated by a group of people who are organized in a specific way around an ideology or way of 
thinking, directly targeting to change the politics of a nation or topple political authorities. They generate 
“us vs. them” situations. Consequences of those types of crimes generally impact more than two nations, 
religions, or countries. The fear of terror and violence has more destructive results on the victimized 
societies. Political centers have been a natural actor in this struggle. 
On the other hand, non-political crimes such as petty crimes, crimes against property, drug trafficking, 
and to some extent human trafficking are considered threats to societies. In that case, humanity in general is 
victimized. For this reason, countries find wider grounds to voluntarily pool and coordinate their resources. 
Except for the drug cartels in Latin America and a few organized crime groups in Southern Europe, any 
criminal group has had the capacity and reason to directly confront governmental authorities to sustain their 
activities. 
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1. Structural Relations: Intergovernmental vs. Transgovernmental 
Relations 
Intergovernmental cooperative relationships arise when states form permanent 
international institutions at the state-to-state level. Information exchange is formalized 
within the confines of diplomatic practices and strategic and tactical decision-making 
processes are highly influenced by the dynamics of state level international relations.12 
On the other hand, transgovernmental relations occur when sub-state actors 
interact directly with their corresponding counterparts in other states “and these sub-units 
of different governments are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of chief 
executives of those governments.”13 In this kind of setting, organizational cultures, 
institutional identities and norms and practices play key roles, and information exchange 
is semi-formalized including formal and fraternal relations. The impetus for cooperation 
is mostly professional rather than political. Decision-making processes are comparatively 
more democratic and institutions have tactical, operational, and to some extent strategic 
level autonomy in shaping their strategies.14 
Transgovernmentalism, a concept developed by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s, 
basically criticizes the frustrating delays in operationalizing cooperation ideas, long and 
complicated decision-making procedures, and dubious integrity of international 
bureaucrats.15 Taking into account the impacts of the developments in 
telecommunications and transportation means, transgovernmentalism theory asserts that 
national institutions have been getting closer to each other.16 
                                                 
12 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), 10. 
13 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations,” World Politics 27, no. 1 (1974): 43, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009925. 
14 Ibid., 42. 
15 Transgovernmentalism theory was developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in the 
1970s. The primary goal of the theory was to explain the characteristics of contemporary transnational 
agency-to-agency relations. 
16 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” 39; Kal 
Raustiala, “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law,” Virginia Journal of International Law. 43, no. 1 (2002): 5. 
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There are two basic types of cooperative transgovernmental behavior: policy 
coordination and transgovernmental coalition building.17 Transnational interactions are 
argued to make societies more sensitive to each other and this sensitivity eventually leads 
to taking into account the ‘others’ while making decisions, even on some very delicate 
issues.18 They define policy coordination as the activities that enable the smooth 
implementation or adjustment of policies in the lack of superior political leadership. On 
the other hand, they outline transgovernmental coalition building as the outcome that 
occurs when “like-minded agencies” form transnational bodies with different 
governments against components of their own administrative structures.19 
The necessary conditions for national police agencies to collaborate are having a 
distinctive institutional identity and the nurturing of an organizational culture compatible 
with the international policing community. Mathieu Deflem concludes in his 
“Bureaucratization Theory” that police agencies can accomplish their goals only if they 
attain some level of autonomy from their political centers. This domestic level of 
autonomy also yields similar ramifications at the international level.  
Deflem’s theory takes Weber’s definition of the bureaucratic organization as 
legitimate, professionalized, autonomous organizational structures.20 Deflem defines 
bureaucratic autonomy as the detachment from the political authorities’ direct influence, 
and professional independence of the police in determining the most appropriate means in 
reaching the depicted ends of the state. He sees the depoliticization of the police as a 
priori condition for the operationalization of international police cooperation.21 
This thesis argues that considering police organizations completely detached from 
political leadership is unrealistic. However, the autonomy of international police 
organizations should be interpreted as their freedom to design and use the appropriate 
                                                 
17 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” 44. 
18 Ibid., 42. 
19 Ibid., 44. 
20 Deflem, “Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundations of International Police 
Cooperation.” 
21 Ibid., 742. 
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means to counter terrorism and other crimes. In this sense, the theories of 
transgovernmentalism and bureaucratization are convergent and mutually reinforcing in 
many aspects. The arguments of Deflem are a priori condition for the operationalization 
of international police cooperation in a transgovernmental structure. 
According to Nadelmann, IPCOs do not coordinate policies but instead attempt to 
eliminate frictions in their transactions. In his “Harmonization Theory,” he contends that 
all multilateral cooperative policing initiatives basically strive to help law enforcement 
agencies to overcome disagreements arising from conflicting sovereignties, political 
tensions, and differences among law enforcement systems. In doing so, they try to 
establish some sort of consensus among criminal law systems that can create a new 
framework to enhance international police cooperation.22 
IPCOs do not have the customary functions and competencies of traditional law 
enforcement agencies. Instead, these institutions primarily serve as intelligence 
clearinghouses and as intermediary hubs in the transition of capacity building activities.23 
The author argues that IPCOs built on a transgovernmental structure would be successful 
in maintaining the required autonomy and mutual understanding to exchange 
information. 
One of the fundamental goals of IPCOs is facilitating timely collection, 
processing, and sharing of information as well as providing a platform on which police 
agencies can efficiently interact with each other. The whole concept of institutional 
police cooperation has been formed around the timely, adequate, and secure exchange of 
“processed” information.24 
                                                 
22 Huseyin Ors, “What are the Lessons That Can Be Learned From Turkey’s Transnational 
Operational Police Cooperation Experiences?” (Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - Newark, 
2011), 17, http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.1/rucore10002600001.ETD.000061088. 
23 Nadia Gerspacher, “The Roles of International Police Cooperation Organizations,” European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Justice 13, no. 3 (2005): 413, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=17752
124&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
24 “History of the EUROPOL,” Official Website, European Police Office, 2012, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149. 
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Information has two dimensions in terms of policing purposes. First, raw data or 
unrefined information is processed to create actionable intelligence. Second, professional 
knowledge and experiences are exchanged.25 This often leads to an increased awareness 
and willingness to work collaboratively on specific criminal matters such as drug 
trafficking and terrorism.26 The raising of awareness is also one of the expected 
utilizations of transgovernmental organizations and a stepping stone for further policy 
coordination. 
The impacts of structural relations can be seen mostly in the intelligence exchange 
abilities of IPCOs. IPCOs that cannot come up with functioning intelligence exchange 
mechanisms are more inclined to undertake capacity building and ad hoc assistance 
activities. Capacity building activities are relatively easier to implement because both the 
IPCO and the benefitting country gain some acquisitions. While carrying out these 
activities the IPCO gathers more material resources from the constituent national 
agencies/governments and enhance its credibility, and the benefitting country receives 
training and/or new equipment. 
Potentially, international police organizations can be a highly effective tool to 
counter terrorism. As Michael D. Bayer argues, the “culture of the badge” provides an 
immediate basis of trust and commonality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, 
and ethnicity.27 Studies on the efficiency of international police cooperation in the realm 
of counter terrorism suggest that proactive international policing measures against 
transnational terrorism may yield a return on investment (ROI) of $200 per $1 spent on 
police cooperation tactics.28 It is a matter of fact that police agencies cannot counter 
ideologies or eliminate systemic causes of terrorism, but they can help prevent or at least 
mitigate terrorist incidents and run swift and comprehensive investigations that bring 
                                                 
25 Gerspacher, “The Roles of International Police Cooperation Organizations,” 413. 
26 Ibid., 423. 
27 Michael D. Bayer, The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and National 
Intelligence (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence 
Research, NDIC Press, 2010), http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo6214. 
28 Sandler T., Arce D.G., and Enders W., “An Evaluation of Interpol’s Cooperative-Based 
Counterterrorism Linkages,” Journal of Law and Economics 54, no. 1 (2011): 79–110. 
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suspects to justice. Additionally, the use of police forces may help minimize the negative 
unintended consequences of harsher, militarized counter terrorism policies. 
Transgovernmentalism, bureaucratization, and harmonization theories suggest a 
convergent line of thinking, where bureaucratization provides the preliminary premises 
for cooperation, transgovernmental relations and networks to jointly operationalize 
cooperative action. Consequently, coordinated policies and transgovernmental coalitions 
reduce tension between different police agencies and allow national police agencies to 
operate in an environment that is conducive for effective international cooperation. 
2. Geographic Proximity: Regionalism vs. Globalism 
While studying the ability of IPCOs to counter transnational terrorism, the 
impacts of regionalism can be analyzed in two dimensions: (1) problem-centric and (2) 
solution-centric. These two dimensions are equally important for operational police 
cooperation on countering transnational terrorism. The problem-centric dimension is 
related to the geographic accumulation of terrorist acts in specific geographic regions. 
The solution-centric dimension is the possible positive outcomes of regional cooperation 
organizations in facilitating cooperative action.  
Terrorism has plagued almost all nations on earth in one way or another. In a 
geopolitical classification, terrorism has two basic forms: domestic and transnational. 
This project specifically scrutinizes the ways of countering transnational terrorism. 
Although terrorist groups exist in many regions of the world, the analysis of the data on 
terrorist activity shows that most terrorism is either entirely domestic or regionally based, 
and very little spans the globe. 
According to data from the RAND Database of World Terrorist Incidents Project 
(RDWTI), 29,664 terrorist incidents occurred between 2000 and 2009. Of those 29,664 
incidents, 7662 (25.82 had been acclaimed by 615 different terrorist groups and 797 
(10.40%) of those acclaimed incidents were coded as transregional terrorist attacks, 
perpetrated by 224 (36.42%) terrorist groups. The analysis of these 797 attacks shows 
that only 92 (1.2%) of all terrorist attacks were committed by six (0.97%) terrorist groups 
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that had been active in more than one specific geographic region.29 The analysis also 
shows that transnational terrorist groups operate often within a specific geographic 
region, and this reality refers to the problem-centric dimension of the regional 
countermeasures against transnational terrorism problem (see footnotes).  
On the flip side, regionalism is of great importance for any societal issue that 
requires collective action and mutual understanding. Specifically, in international police 
cooperation, where relations usually depend on mutual trust and sympathy, regional 
action is “the key” in initiating and sustaining counter terrorism activities. 
Notwithstanding that, regionalism also enables police agencies to be efficient in terms of 
time and allocated resources. Linguistic, cultural, and normative commonalities among 
                                                 
29 “The RAND Database of World Terrorist Incidents” Official Website, RAND Corporation, 2012, 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php.(accessed 12/28/2011)The data comprises the period of Jan 1, 
2000 to Dec 31, 2009—the latest date available in the data set. 
Defining Terrorism, WP 3, Deliverable 4, 70.The criteria used to assess the geographical relevance of 
terrorism are (1) the country of the terrorist act, (2) the nationality of the perpetrator, and (3) the nationality 
of the target. The terrorist acts in which either one of the last two criteria is not coinciding with the first 
criterion are considered as non-domestic terrorist incidents. 
“United Nations Statistics Division- Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49)” Official 
Website, UN Statistics Division, 2011, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. (accessed 
12/31/2011).The locations of terrorist incidents in the RAND data is grouped under 22 geographical sub-
regions in five continents and based on the United Nations Statistical Division’s working categorization. 
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Terrorism Ends - Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Organizations- Raw Data Download, MIPT Data”, 2009, http://www.howterrorismends.com/about/raw-
data-downloads. One attack in North Africa that was attributed to the Taliban is ignored and Taliban (116 
attacks in total) attacks are placed in the regional groups cluster. 
In order to add further validation to the argument and prevent any biases, the MIPT (Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Knowledge Database was also analyzed. The cross-matching 
analysis of the terrorist groups that are flagged as “active” by the year 2006 with the RAND Database 
returns no results after 2000, but one incident for “Takfir wa Hijra” and two incidents for “Mujahedin-e 
Khal” in addition to “al-Qaeda.” The analysis of the MIPT Knowledge Database reveals that only 14 
terrorist groups out of a total of 285 organizations that were active after 2000 till 2006 
attempted/committed transregional terrorist activities. In addition, Polisario Front, National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland-Khaplang, People’s Liberation Front, and Arab Liberation Front cannot be considered 
as global terrorist organizations with given bases of operations. 
Based on the research, aforementioned “global” terrorist groups are as follows: (1)Al-Qaeda, (2) Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, (3) Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), (4) Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA), (5) Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and (6) Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). 
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police agencies of neighboring states, as well as being exposed to similar problems in the 
same region, help them to truly understand their counterpart’s positions and concerns. 30 
Some might argue that regional organizations will be hindered in their ability to 
deal with truly global threats. However, regional organizations can and have overcome 
this impediment by integrating into worldwide policing networks, by establishing direct 
contacts with related countries or other regional entities, and through the mediation of 
peripheral countries.31 
Regional organizations enhance the structural, functional, and cultural congruence 
of police organizations. This is an intuitive consequence due to the fact that police 
agencies around the world undertake similar tasks and employ similar strategies. The 
increasing interactions with international counterparts, as well as the common 
bureaucratization practices of nation states, have made police agencies functionally and 
culturally similar to their counterparts in other countries. This reality is called structural 
isomorphism in the literature and has a considerable impact on the formation of a 
common policing culture.32 
3. Case Selection 
Currently, five IPCOs are seen to be very vigilant and active against transnational 
terrorism in the international arena: the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), International Criminal Police Organization–INTERPOL, European Police 
Office (EUROPOL), Southeast European Law Enforcements Center (SELEC), and 
OSCE/SPMU (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Strategic Police 
Matters Unit). By dropping OSCE/SPMU from this list due to the distribution of 
countering terrorism tasks between different units such as the Anti-Terrorism Unit, 
SPMU, and to some extent the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
                                                 
30 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” 45. 
31 EUROPOL has an operational agreement with the South Eastern Law Enforcement Center and 
cooperates with several non-EU member states, such as the U.S., Turkey, and Northern African countries 
as needed. EUROPOL also has other agreements with INTERPOL and the United Nations.  
32 Raustiala, “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the 
Future of International Law,” 13. 
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Rights (ODIHR), this leaves four similarly-tasked ICPOs to be analyzed. The variation of 
these institutions with respect to the independent variables (IVs) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Variation Between IPCOs33 
For instance, the UNODC identifies itself as a global leader in fighting 
transnational crime and terrorism and the organization pays special attention to police 
cooperation.34 Additionally, all of the scrutinized ICPOs resort to similar cooperative 
instruments to foster international police cooperation. Although the approaches and 
capabilities of each organization vary, which is the puzzle of this thesis, they consider 
police cooperation and international policing community as assets that can be utilized to 
                                                 
33 Figure 1 demonstrates the basic variation of these case studies on the examined IVs. Nonetheless, 
the variation on the geographic proximity variable is not completely clear cut. For instance, EUROPOL’s 
jurisdiction covers a relatively huge territory and it has direct contacts and strategic agreements with 
several countries outside Europe. In addition, the UNODC launches regional initiatives to increase its 
efficiency. It is also required to take note that EUROPOL’s system can be argued as two-thirds 
transgovernmental and one-third intergovernmental. Since the Council of the European Union directly 
supervises EUROPOL, the European Union as an umbrella organization still has some gravity in the 
decision making and funding procedures. 
34 “About UNODC” Official Website, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop. (accessed 03/01/2012) 
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fight transnational terrorism. One of the most significant distinctions between 
transgovernmental and intergovernmental organizations is that the former organizations 
have investigative competencies and exchange intelligence whereas the latter rely on 
technical assistance and the harmonization of legal systems and policies.  
The following four chapters will offer case studies of the UNODC, INTERPOL, 
EUROPOL and the SECI/SELEC respectively. The author will demonstrate that the more 
transgovernmental and regional an organization is, the more effectively it carries out the 
three key functions of (1) information exchange, (2) contracting and policy coordination, 
and (3) ad hoc assistance and capacity building.35 These functions are a proxy for 
effectiveness against terrorism. The final chapter re-examines the hypotheses of the thesis 
based on the lessons learned in the case studies. Recommendations will be made to be 
applied on future police cooperative initiatives. 
 
                                                 
35 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 9–11. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION 
(INTERPOL) 
A. PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
INTERPOL is the largest police cooperation organization in the world with 190 
national/federal police agencies as members. The primary mission of the organization is 
to “prevent and fight crime through enhanced international police cooperation.”36 The 
primary goal of INTERPOL is to provide necessary tools, services, and communication 
channels to police agencies all over the world to do their jobs effectively.37 
INTERPOL has three core functions. First, the organization serves as a global 
police communications system that is open to any willing state's law enforcement agency. 
Second, it offers several sophisticated criminal databases and in-depth professional 
analysis on criminal issues. Lastly, through capacity building and awareness raising 
activities it supports police agencies in their proactive policing practices.38 
Since its reformation in 1956, three principles have landmarked INTERPOL’s 
activities: (1) respect of national sovereignty, (2) enforcement of ordinary criminal law, 
and (3) universality.39 The sovereignty principle has been interpreted as the enforcement 
of national laws by national police forces in their own territories. The principle of the 
enforcement of ordinary criminal law refers to the apolitical nature of the organization. 
INTERPOL Constitution prohibits the organization’s involvement in any crimes that 
have political, military, religious or racial motivation.40 Being influenced by the legacy of 
                                                 
36 “INTERPOL Overview,” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, 
http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview. 
37 “INTERPOL Overview” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, 
http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview. (accessed 03/01/2012) 
38 Hurst, “INTERPOL - Providing Support and Assistance to Combat International Terrorism,” 3. 
39 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 45. 
40 ICPO-INTERPOL General Secretariat, “INTERPOL Constitution”, 1956, http://interpol.int/About-
INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution Art. 3; Michael Barnett and Liv Coleman, “Designing 
Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly 
49, no. 4 (2005): 604, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693502. 
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the pre-WWII period, this apolitical nature had been a central issue in INTERPOL to 
keep its autonomy intact.41 However, beginning in the 1960s and the rise of terrorist 
incidents, INTERPOL had to review its stance towards the terrorism problem.42 Finally 
in 1984, INTERPOL recoded the meaning of “political” in the General Assembly held in 
Luxembourg.43 Today, INTERPOL considers terrorism as one of the most important 
priorities of the organization.44 The principle of universality is coded to tackle any sort of 
geographic and linguistic obstacles to interstate cooperative activities.45 
B. STRUCTURE, BUDGET, AND DECISION MAKING 
The predecessor of INTERPOL, the first International Criminal Police Congress, 
convened in Monaco in 1914. Senior police officers, lawyers, and magistrates from 14 
nations attended this conference and discussed issues on the procedures of arrest, 
identification, centralized criminal record keeping, and procedures of extradition.46 The 
main concern lying beneath the convening of a police conference was different from 
previous police cooperation initiatives that took place in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In that case, the theft of imperial jewels in Vienna in 1913 and discovery of these 
jewels in another European country several weeks later sparked the idea of establishing a 
collaborative police institution that could counter transnational ordinary crimes. Dr. 
Johannes Schober, president of the Vienna Police, led the initiative with the support of 
Prince Albert of Monaco.47 
                                                 
41 Barnett and Coleman, “Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International 
Organizations,” 607. 
42 Ibid., 610. 
43 Ibid., 612. 
44 The special emphasis on terrorism-related issues can easily be noticed in almost all addresses of 
Secretary Generals in any occasion and in their opening remarks in the annual activity reports, in particular 
in the last ten years. 
45 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 44. 
46 “INTERPOL’s History” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, 
http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/History. (accessed 03/01/2012). 
47 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 42. 
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During the WWI period, very little had been done within the aforementioned 
framework. Fighting states did not see any benefit to sharing information with their 
enemies. However, the idea was not totally forgotten and in 1923, Dr. J. Schober revived 
the initiative and called states for a second conference. In the second meeting, 21 
participating parties adopted an agreement and officially founded the International 
Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) as its headquarters was set in Vienna, Austria.48 
Many of the participants of this conference attended the meeting without any official 
standing but instead based on their professional discretion on the requirement of a 
transnational cooperative action.49 
From 1923 to 1938, the ICPC ratified several resolutions. Through these 
resolutions member states accepted the establishment of a central point of contact—the 
forerunner of the National Central Bureaus (NCB)—to form specialized departments to 
deal with currency counterfeiting, criminal records, and passport forgery; create the post 
of Secretary General; and launch an international radio network. By the year of 1938, the 
organization fell under the control of the Nazis and since many countries stopped 
participating, the ICPC ceased to exist until 1946.50 
After the end of WWII, Belgium led the revival of the organization. The 
headquarters was reset in Paris, France, and “INTERPOL” was chosen as the telegraphic 
address of the organization. In 1949, the United Nations granted consultative status to 
INTERPOL as a nongovernmental organization. This was a great leap forward on the 
account of prestige and credibility of the organization. In 1956, the ICPC members 
adopted a new constitution and changed the abbreviation of the organization to ICPO-
INTERPOL.51 
INTERPOL is governed by member countries through democratic principles and 
within clearly defined legal frameworks and rules of operations. The basic components of 
                                                 
48Ibid.; “INTERPOL’s History.” 





the INTERPOL system are the General Assembly, Executive Committee, General 
Secretariat, National Central Bureaus (NCBs), and the Commission for the Control of 
INTERPOL’s Files (CFF). The General Assembly as the supreme governing body is 
comprised of delegates from member countries and it convenes annually in different 
countries. Each delegate has one vote and the resolutions are adopted based on the simple 
majority. The General Assembly also elects the Executive Committee.52  
National Central Bureaus and the General Secretariat implement the strategic- 
level decisions that were taken by the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. 
The Executive Committee is composed of the president, three vice presidents, and nine 
members. The Executive Committee members cannot immediately stand for the election 
for the same posts in the succeeding period.53 
The real implementation organs of INTERPOL are the NCBs and the General 
Secretariat. Located in Lyon, France, the General Secretariat operates around the clock, 
365 days a year. It oversees and coordinates the information going through its channels in 
four official INTERPOL languages. INTERPOL also has acknowledged the value of 
regionalism and established seven regional bureaus.54 INTERPOL has also liaison offices 
at the United Nations in New York and at the European Union in Brussels.55 
One of the most important issues in INTERPOL is the confidentiality and 
protection of personal data stored in INTERPOL databases. To ensure the processing and 
protection of the data, the CFF monitors, advises, and processes the access requests to 
 
                                                 
52 “INTERPOL General Assembly” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012, http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/General-Assembly (accessed 03/01/2012); “INTERPOL 
Structure and Governance” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, 
http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-governance. 
53 “INTERPOL Executive Committee” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012, http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-governance/Executive-Committee (accessed 
03/01/2012). 
54 These bureaus are located in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Cameroon (Yaoundé), Côte d’Ivoire 
(Abidjan), El Salvador (San Salvador), Kenya (Nairobi), Thailand (Bangkok), and Zimbabwe (Harare). 
55 “INTERPOL General Secretariat” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012, http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-governance/General-Secretariat (accessed 
03/01/2012). 
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INTERPOL’s files in line with INTERPOL’s rules and regulations. The General 
Assembly integrated the CFF to INTERPOL’s internal structure to guarantee its 
independence.56 
The financial resources of the organization are direct contributions from its 
members and gifts, subsidies, grants, and other resources that are approved by the 
Executive Committee.57 Initially, member countries had paid their membership dues in a 
population-based system. However, this system had caused great powers to hold more 
power and influence in the organization. In the late 1950s, INTERPOL adopted a 
different system where major powers started to contribute relatively equal amounts.58 
C. INFORMATION EXCHANGE  
INTERPOL has designated information exchange as its core function. In order to 
achieve this function and link police agencies even continents apart, INTERPOL has 
heavily invested in sophisticated communication channels throughout its history. The 
most recent communication system, namely I-24/7 created in 2003, works around the 
clock and provides secure communication channels to 190 NCBs for both incoming and 
outgoing messages. This system also serves as an access point to reach a range of 
online/offline criminal databases that are instantly updated when new data is entered into 
the system.59 
INTERPOL also strives to maintain interpersonal relations and fraternal 
communications via different international events. The most common form of this 
communication is realized by the regional and global symposiums, conferences, and 
operation meetings held in different countries. INTERPOL does not have a full-time 
                                                 
56 “INTERPOL Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files” Official Website, International 
Criminal Police Organization, 2012, http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-
governance/CCF/Comission-for-the-Control-of-INTERPOL’s-Files (accessed 03/01/2012). 
57 ICPO-INTERPOL General Secretariat, “INTERPOL Constitution” Art. 38. 
58 Barnett and Coleman, “Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International 
Organizations,” 609. 
59“INTERPOL’s Priority Crime Areas” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012, http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Priorities (accessed 03/01/2012). 
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liaison system.60 Although the personnel seconded or contracted in the headquarters 
facilitate communication with members countries, these personnel do not have liaison 
duties.61 
 INTERPOL's communication system has two major actors, one critical element, 
and one facilitating instrument. The major actors are NCBs located in each member state 
and a Command and Control Center (CCC) positioned in INTERPOL headquarters (HQ). 
NCBs are of value because they are the end users and the "spring" of exchanged 
information at the same time. The CCC is important because it orchestrates all the 
transactions and oversees the proper functioning of the system in four languages.62 
The critical elements of the system are the aforementioned databases. As of 2012, 
there are 11 databases (DB) open to queries from any of the member countries. Five of 
those databases are comparatively more important for counter terrorism operations: the 
(1) Fusion Task Force DB, which was specifically designed for worldwide counter 
terrorism (CT) operations; (2) INTERPOL Notices, (3) Stolen and Lost Travel 
Documents DB; (4) Fingerprints DB, and (5) Firearms DB.63 
The INTERPOL system also conveys a useful data enhancement and analysis tool 
along with the I-24/7 system. I-link is an operational system that helps NCB and HQ 
officers relate seemingly independent criminal data and unveil the connections between 
covert networks. Moreover, it eases the transmission of information directly from 
national databases to the INTERPOL system and vice versa.64 
                                                 
60 Gerspacher, “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to Transnational Crime: A 
Study of Institutional Effectiveness,” 50. 
61 “INTERPOL General Secretariat.” 
62 English, Arabic, French, and Spanish are the four official languages of INTERPOL.  
61“INTERPOL Databases” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, 
http://interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases (accessed 03/01/2012).The other databases are Child 
Sexual Exploitation Images, DNA profiles, Stolen Works of Art, Stolen Motor Vehicles, and Stolen 
Administrative Documents.  
64 “INTERPOL Data Exchange I-link” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012, http://interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Data-exchange/I-link (accessed 03/01/2012). 
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In INTERPOL, counter terrorism activities are coordinated by the Public Safety 
and Terrorism Directorate (PST). The Directorate specifically focuses on identifying 
extremists and fundamentalist terrorists and individuals suspected of being associated 
with terrorist groups; developing actionable intelligence that can lead to the arrest and the 
extradition of the suspects; generating a list of terrorists who are wanted at the 
international level; and discovering modus operandi and recruitment methods of terrorist 
organizations.65 
 The whole system is sufficiently but strictly compartmentalized. Since the 
information is considered one of the most valuable assets of the organization, all 
necessary measures are taken to guarantee its integrity. On the account of CT tools, 
INTERPOL offers a "Terrorism Secure Website” that is only accessible to exclusively 
authorized users in NCBs. Through this channel, law enforcement officers can reach out 
to information on INTERPOL terrorism working group meetings, notices, elaborate 
analyses of terrorism-related issues and lists of suspected or wanted terrorists.66 
INTERPOL handles CT issues proactively and in a broader context. The 
prevention of bioterrorism, prevention of nuclear terrorism, and the financing of terrorism 
are the major issues dealt with by INTERPOL on a global scale. Besides these issues, the 
Fusion Task Force (FTF) and the regional projects conducted under the framework of the 
FTF are proven to yield tangible, satisfactory results in a short span of time.67 
Founded in 2002, the Fusion Task Force is primarily an analysis and 
communication framework in which participating countries can share pertinent 
information about terrorist groups and terrorist incidents in their territories and in return, 
receive processed information about the possible links of the terrorist groups operating in 
that area. The information is provided mostly in a declassified form, such as lists of 
suspected terrorists, criminal records, and notices. The system works as a pointer and 
                                                 
65 INTERPOL at Work 2001 (Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2002), 66, 
http://interpol.int/content/download/774/6147/version/5/file/agn71r01.pdf;. 
66 Hurst, “INTERPOL - Providing Support and Assistance to Combat International Terrorism,” 4. 
67 INTERPOL Annual Report 2008 (Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2009), 26, 
http://interpol.int/content/download/767/6043/version/5/file/iaw2008.pdf. 
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early warning system about the suspicious logistics networks and individuals that support 
terrorist activities.68 The FTF has a database in which the names of individuals that 
member countries discovered as being trained in terrorist camps throughout the world are 
kept.69 
From its beginning, eight projects have been conducted under the FTF 
framework.70 As of 2012, six projects are still in effect.71 These projects are the regional 
responses of INTERPOL to the terrorism problem. It is also argued in the literature that 
this regionally focused information exchange efforts are the intuitive institutional 
responses of INTERPOL to the environment, in which many regional police 
organizations started to emerge, and attempts to stay relevant both to the international 
community and member states.72 
Project Kalkan, developed to fight terrorism in Central Asia, is praised as one of 
the most successful FTF projects. Project Kalkan exemplifies how international police 
cooperation can be beneficial when countries share high-quality information. After the 
first and second working meetings, the number of countries participating in the project 
increased from five to more than 75 by 2008.73 In 2007, the number of messages 
                                                 
68 INTERPOL General Secretariat 2002 Activity Report (Lyon, France: INTERPOL General 
Secretariat, 2003), 9–10, http://interpol.int/content/download/773/6131/version/5/file/agn72r01.pdf;. 
69 INTERPOL Annual Activity Report 2004 (Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2005), 12, 
http://interpol.int/content/download/771/6099/version/5/file/iaw2004.pdf; INTERPOL General Secretariat 
2003 Activity Report (Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2004), 19, 
http://interpol.int/content/download/772/6115/version/5/file/agn73r01.pdf. 
70 Annual Reports of International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (Lyon, France: The 
INTERPOL, 2010 1999), http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/Publications/default.asp; “INTERPOL Fusion 
Task Force” Official Website, International Criminal Police Organization, 2012, http://interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Terrorism/Fusion-Task-Force (03/01/2012).Project Pacific, 2002, Southeast Asia; Project Baobab, 
2003, Africa; Project Tent, 2003, Terrorist Camps; Project Passage, 2003, Organized Crime-Terrorism 
Linkages in Mediterranean; Project Kalkan, 2004, Central Asia; Project Amazon, 2005, Latin America; 
Project Middle East, 2005, Middle East; Project Nexus, 2009, Europe  
71 INTERPOL Fusion Task Force Project Al Qabdah (Middle East and North Africa); Project Amazon 
(Central and South America); Project Baobab (East, West and Southern Africa); Project Kalkan (Central 
and South Asia); Project Nexus (Europe); Project Pacific (Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands). 
72 Barnett and Coleman, “Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International 
Organizations,” 611. 
73 INTERPOL Annual Report 2008, 26. 
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regarding this project totaled 2,237 with a 433% rise compared to the 2002-2003 
period.74 In the scope of Project Kalkan, the names of 1,087 terrorists were added into the 
database. By 2007, the number of terrorists arrested in connection with this project 
increased 183%. Fourteen terrorist groups operating in Central Asia have been profiled in 
this project.75 
In one year from 2006 to 2007, INTERPOL received more than 660 messages 
reporting the identity details of more than 130 terrorists and their modus operandi. In 
2007, Project Kalkan started to focus on the profiles of 169 terrorists belonging to al 
Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan. By 2008, more than 80 terrorists were arrested based 
on the information provided through Project Kalkan.76 
D. POLICY COORDINATION AND CONTRACTING 
Even though INTERPOL’s main concern is to provide a platform for the member 
countries through which they can communicate securely and rapidly, it does not neglect 
the importance of concerted action and the traditional obstacles of international 
cooperation. The political systems, diverging codes of conducts, attitudes towards 
criminality and punishment, corruption, distrust, different languages, legal systems, 
cultural differences, and geographic distances are the obstacles to international police 
cooperation.77 In order to have effective operating information exchange mechanisms and 
fruitful cooperative police action, IPCOs and member countries have to develop and 
implement congruent policies that can overcome those aforementioned obstacles.  
In INTERPOL’s case, there are two different types of policy coordination 
mechanisms. The first one is the unintentional policy coordination mechanisms that have 
occurred between member countries because of interaction and cooperation. The second 
type of policy coordination mechanism is the realignment of the organization and 
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member states by adhering to the INTERPOL Constitution and international agreements 
to adapt themselves to the changing international environment and criminal threats that 
gain importance in the international arena. The former has a direct impact on the policies 
of the countries whereas the latter has an indirect influence on the members. 
Unintentional coordination has a direct impact on policies, while the realignment of 
member states has an indirect influence on members? Seems it should be the opposite. 
INTERPOL utilizes four instruments to achieve policy coordination. The first 
instrument is its Constitution, which went through a comprehensive reformation in 1956 
and then remained almost unchanged with the exception of some technical additions and 
amendments.78 INTERPOL is structured on a constitutional model; however, the 
admission process is not subject to an official ratification process like other international 
agreements. The lack of a ratification process is criticized as hampering the collaborative 
action and complicating the membership status.79 
The weak contracting power of the INTERPOL Constitution, which cannot force 
member countries to take action, brings both advantages and disadvantages to 
INTERPOL. That kind of setting enables INTERPOL to be flexible and adaptable to the 
changing environment.80 On the other hand, it causes a free rider problem in the system 
and selective application of INTERPOL rules by the member countries. In INTERPOL, 
information exchange is conducted on a voluntarily basis.81 INTERPOL seeks to exert its 
influence on the political level through its consultative role in the UN Security Council. 
In addition, the special emphasis on the “neutrality” of the organization and refraining 
from involving any kind of political, racial, or subversive incident are two major 
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obstacles in front of INTERPOL in implementing CT policies. The involvement of 
INTERPOL in CT operations is still done by a “reinterpretation” of Constitution Article 
3.82 
The second instrument devised by INTERPOL is a legal tool, which was 
developed to provide guidance to any country that is willing to engage in bilateral police 
cooperation activities with another country. The Model Agreement is a sort of a la carte 
menu of international police cooperation techniques that have proven to be feasible, 
necessary, and successful. It covers a broad set of issues including controlled delivery 
and data exchange procedures, extradition rules, and data protection formalities. The 
“right of pursuit” and the “right of observation” are two important instruments regulated 
in this model agreement that authorizes national police forces to transcend borders to 
continue surveillance and “observe” the interrogations undertaken in a foreign country.83 
The third instrument is not a designated mechanism but instead a practical 
implementation structure. INTERPOL strives to promote interpersonal relations and face-
to-face communication between police officials of the member countries through high-
level conferences, operational workshops, and symposiums. The raised awareness in 
these operational and tactical/strategic level circles are carried back to the member 
countries and shared by the political authorities. Depending on the strengths of the police 
agencies’ professional identities, in Mintzberg’s terminology, they may create 
“organizational pulls” on the political decision-making structures.84 
The last tool is also a consequence of engaging in cooperation through 
INTERPOL channels. Information exchange methods have simultaneously become more 
sophisticated as the volume and diversity of the information flowing through the 
INTERPOL services have increased. In order to manage this information flow and ensure 
the integrity and confidentiality of information, INTERPOL has standardized and 
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formalized its information exchange procedures. On the other hand, member countries 
have been compelled to build compatible systems in their own countries to be able to 
comply with the rules of INTERPOL and gather the required data. This alignment 
affected the data collection, storing, and protection policies in the member states. 
Moreover, in order to ensure smooth and instantaneous information flow, member states 
have created alike units within their organizations that specialize on the priority areas 
designated by INTERPOL. 
E. AD HOC ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
Capacity building activities have been one of the most prevalent components of 
international organizations. These activities include training, workshops, symposiums 
and direct technical assistance, and constitute one aspect of capacity building activities in 
INTERPOL. The second and relatively new form of capacity building activities includes 
specialized teams assigned to member countries upon their requests on an ad hoc basis. 
Namely, Instant Response Teams (IRTs) and INTERPOL Major Events Support Teams 
(IMESTs) offer the required equipment and knowledge to the states in the investigations 
of major terrorist/ordinary criminal incidents or in the security planning phases of major 
international events. They do so by facilitating information exchange with INTERPOL 
HQs and other member states. 
In INTERPOL’s case, the existence of technological infrastructure and a suitable 
organizational structure as well as equipping officials who are deployed in NCBs and in 
other related units with required skills are of great importance.85 On some occasions, 
INTERPOL assists member countries directly by establishing their NCBs and providing 
communication equipment, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000.86 Similar capacity 
building activities also took place in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.87 
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Training activities are the most demanded and easily implemented capacity-
building efforts. Training programs particularly on the prevention of bioterrorism and 
nuclear terrorism as well as on the methods to stop the financing of terrorism are 
undertaken in many countries. Although the bioterrorism and nuclear terrorism issues 
generally are not considered in the traditional policing agenda, the trainings have helped 
in raising the awareness on these issues by introducing the threats posed by these 
challenges to the international policing community.88 
The IRTs and IMESTs provide the necessary know-how and professional 
assistance to the member countries in case of an investigation, major event, or a crisis. 
These teams can be considered as small mobile NCBs and carry online/offline 
INTERPOL services anywhere they are needed. So far, 130 teams have been deployed to 
different locations across the world. The occasions that these teams are assigned vary on 
a span of bombing attacks to the Olympic Games.89 
F. CONCLUSION 
INTERPOL is structured mainly in a transgovernmental manner and peer-to-peer 
relations at an agency scale have been the crux of cooperation and communication in the 
organization. The analysis of INTERPOL’s effectiveness on countering transnational 
terrorism based on the two IVs of this project shows that INTERPOL’s 
transgovernmental structure maintains a fertile environment in which cooperative action 
thrives; however, its global nature inhibits the organization’s efficiency and effectiveness 
due to the formalized information exchange and data protection procedures. On the other 
hand, having sophisticated electronic communication means and an in-depth analysis 
capacity as well as success in offering capacity-building activities and contracting power, 
INTERPOL can be considered as partially successful in attaining its objectives on 
countering terrorism. 
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Throughout its history, the “club-like” nature of the organization and its deliberate 
refusal to interfere in politically sensitive criminal issues have helped the organization to 
institutionalize and obtain the necessary credibility in the international arena. This 
credibility is embodied as the material resources pooled by the member countries and 
diplomatic prestige granted by the major international organizations. INTERPOL has 
managed to build highly sophisticated databases and communication channels that 
decrease the costs of information exchange and aggrandize the benefits of cooperative 
action. In addition, INTERPOL has devised both its professional autonomy and 
diplomatic prestige in marketing its services and policies to the actual and potential 
member states. 
The data demonstrates that the most problematic periods occurred in INTERPOL 
history when INTERPOL was dragged into a tradeoff between its professional autonomy 
and member countries’ material contributions. On one hand, the dilemma was 
INTERPOL sought better relations with the governments to obtain more resources in 
order to establish and run a sophisticated global system on countering terrorism. On the 
other hand, the organization’s members have kept in mind that the resources would only 
be provided by states if the organization aligned itself with the providers’ political 
objectives. Such a strategic decision mitigated INTERPOL’s relevance, decreased 
material contribution from member countries, and led to the emergence of new regional 
police cooperation institutions that put counter terrorism activities in the core of their 
mandates.  
INTERPOL’s capacity building function’s effectiveness can be considered as an 
interaction among its transgovernmental relations practices and the regionalism policies 
of the organization. The output of this interaction has had direct implications on the 
available funds for the capacity building activities and institutional independence on the 
allocation of these funds. Aside from focused training programs offered by INTERPOL 
on CT and direct technical assistance activities, the functioning of IRTs and IMESTs, can 
only be realized upon the consent of the requesting countries’ political authorities. These 
teams are indeed relatively untraditional means of police cooperation and they can be 
deemed as a challenge to the monopoly of sovereign state on the legitimate use of force. 
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Particularly, the creation and functioning of these teams have been interrelated not only 
with the availability of funds, but also the congruence and mutual agreement of member 
countries at a political level. Thus, these activities are also an outcome of the policy 
coordination function of INTERPOL. 
In regard to the policy coordination mechanisms, in INTERPOL’s case, the 
political regulations have followed INTERPOL’s cooperation framework. In other words, 
the interaction among the police agencies of member countries and the successful 
integration of INTERPOL’s information exchange mechanisms into the daily work of the 
police officers have implicitly impacted bureaucratic and political entities to build similar 
local law enforcement mechanisms. The rules on data protection and extradition as well 
as the model law of police cooperation have yielded more parallel and compatible 
implementing structures. The implementing structures formed by the law enforcement 
agencies and in a bottom-up fashion have had an indirect impact on the political 
authorities to amend the legislation and their political agendas in line with the other 
member countries. 
The tacit policy coordination utilities have been mostly built within the 
professional cooperation context and in some cases proven to be insufficient for effective 
cooperation. According to Gerspacher, the weak binding power of the INTERPOL 
Constitution has impaired the contracting power of the agency.90 In order to supplement 
the required policy coordination utility and its contracting power, INTERPOL has 
intentionally appealed to secure roles and statuses in other international and/or regional 
political entities. The author suggests that the reason for this relatively weak contracting 
power of the agency derives from its global membership structure. Trying to consolidate 
differing political approaches of its members on a global scale has hampered its policy 
coordination function. 
INTERPOL’s strategy of “global cooperation with regional perspective” evinces 
its adaptation efforts to the “pulls” of regionalism. The effectiveness of counter terrorism 
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operations makes a sharp peak just after the designation of regional counter terrorism 
projects. The efficiency offered by regional settings and their ability to overcome 
cultural, linguistic, and geographic obstacles was discovered by INTERPOL officials. 
Trying to communicate in four languages and assigning project leaders who are familiar 
with the region are the means that have been used by INTERPOL to compensate the 
absence of a liaison structure. Face-to-face, informal communication channels are one of 
the key factors contributing to the overall effectiveness of FTF projects.
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III. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME 
(UNODC) 
A. PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) can be conceived as 
the final stage of the UN’s endeavor in crime prevention. Its mandate covers fighting 
against transnational crimes including illicit drugs, human trafficking, cybercrimes, and 
international terrorism. The UNODC calls itself the universal leader of the fight against 
crime.91 Functioning under the UN Economic and Social Council and specifically 
governed by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the 
UNODC operates worldwide with its 25 regional offices and two liaison bureaus in New 
York and Brussels.92 The UNODC gathers more than 90% of its budget from the 
voluntary contributions of its member states. The institution is directed by an Executive 
General who is appointed by the UN Secretary General. 
The UNODC’s strategy is threefold: (1) research and policy analysis, (2) 
normative work (UN Conventions), and (3) technical assistance.93 These activity areas 
are also formulated in the UNODC’s work program. In line with its strategy, the 
elaborated work program of the UNODC is composed of three major components: (1) 
enhancing the capacity of member states by conducting field-based technical cooperation 
activities; (2) undertaking research and analytical studies to enhance the knowledge on 
crime-related issues and collect scientific evidence to be used in decision-making 
processes; and (3) studying legal and legislative aspects of international cooperation and 
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carrying out targeted projects to foster the normative knowledge base of the member 
states and the UN.94 
The UNODC, and specifically the Terrorism Prevention Branch, has set its focus 
on five thematic areas to address the international terrorism phenomenon: (1) chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, (2) victimization and delivering support to 
the victims of terrorism, (3) interruption of the financing of terrorism, (4) dealing with 
maritime issues, and (5) fighting against the use of the internet for terrorist purposes. 95 
B. STRUCTURE, BUDGET, AND DECISION MAKING 
Since its inception, crime prevention has been amongst the priority agenda issues 
of the United Nations (UN). Feeling the necessity for the UN to assume the leadership in 
crime prevention, UN member states delegated the Secretary General to assemble an 
expert group to conduct research on the appropriate ways of crime prevention and 
handling offenders at the international level.96 
The relationship between the UN and crime prevention issues has always been 
complicated. The UN’s approach to crime prevention, in particular to terrorism, has been 
in a broader context, demanding more active participation of the civilian authorities and 
academia with respect to the other organizations studied in this thesis.97 On the other 
hand, the practical implications of the UN crime prevention efforts specifically relate to 
institutions that are responsible for law enforcement activities in the member states.98 In 
addition to that, most of the assistance requests by the member states to comply with the 
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UN CT mandates, in particular by the nations that are plagued by terrorism and in the 
frontline of the fight against terrorism, have been in the form of technical assistance 
requests to enhance law enforcement capabilities. These enhancements focus on 
improving the border, immigration, and customs controls; tightening the security at ports 
and border crossings; and investigating suspicious financial transactions.99 
The idea of constituting a united office to counter international crime was first 
brought to discussion by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on July 14, 1997, 
in the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly as an effort to reform UN activities.100 In 
the new setting, the United Nations Drug Control Program and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention were going to be merged to address the international 
crime problem in a more coherent and effective way. The locus of the new office was 
proposed to be set in Vienna, Austria. The new unit was initially named as the Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP).101 In 1998, the UN General Assembly 
officially initiated the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. UN Resolution 
A/RES/52/220 article 62 explicitly tasks the ODCCP with promoting the fundamental 
principles of the rule of law and strengthening the cooperation between the national, 
regional authorities and the UN to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations.102 In 2004, the ODCCP was reformed and officially rebuilt as 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.103 
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Drug-related matters have been the foremost important issues for the UNODC 
compared to the other types of crimes including terrorism. One of the reasons of this 
predominance of anti-narcotics efforts might be the legacy and the established 
institutional capacity of the UN Drug Control Program. The other reason may be the 
overwhelming control of the states on the strategic level decision-making procedures of 
the organization by tweaking their contributions between earmarked and general purpose 
financial contributions. As shown in Figure 2, member states have the ability to direct 
and restrict the UNODC’s activities by changing the composition of their financial 
contributions. 
 
Figure 2.   Distribution of the UNODC's Budget Incomes104 
The 9/11 attacks were a turning point for the UN’s counter terrorism activities. 
The unprecedented collective response to terrorism at an international level was 
embodied in UN Resolution 1373 and other resolutions thereto.105 Aside from the 
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political and legal implications of the cited resolution, it urged states to strengthen 
nonmilitary cooperation and foster the exchange of information in terrorism-related 
matters.106 Notwithstanding that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the UN counter terrorism 
activities had been generally driven by the General Assembly. The General Assembly 
created the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) and authored the twelve counter 
terrorism conventions by focusing on the prevention of terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks, 
the Security Council assumed the leadership and the focus of the activities turned into 
countering terrorism.107 
The foundation of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was one of the most 
tangible outcomes of Resolution 1373. The CTC was charged with managing the 
information flow between the member states and the Security Council and providing 
professional guidance to both the member states and the Security Council on terrorism-
related issues to strengthen their CT capacity.108 Nevertheless, the workload undertaken 
by the CTC was beyond its institutional capacity. In 2002, the CTC appealed to the 
UNODC to provide technical guidance to states especially in drafting legislations on 
countering terrorism.109 Moreover, the CTC was not an assistance provider by design, but 
a facilitator in enhancing the counter terrorism capability of the international system.110 
The vacuum in the assistance provider role was filled with the incorporation of the TPB. 
This intra-agency cooperation was then formalized by the UN’s Global Counter 
Terrorism Strategy and other relevant UN resolutions.111 
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The TPB is the specialized unit in the UNODC structure that pools its expertise 
and resources to accomplish the UNODC’s designated goals in the elimination and 
eradication of terrorism. As shown in the organogram in Figure 3, the TPB is placed 
under the Division for Treaty Affairs and comprised of two sub-units, namely the 
Regional and National Terrorism Prevention Unit and Specialized Terrorism Prevention 
Unit.112 The roots of this center can be found in the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Program initiated in 1970. The TPB’s traces can also be seen in the “Vienna 
Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of Twenty-First Century” and 
its affiliated plan of actions.113 
The structure and the role of the TPB were strengthened in 2002 by the UN 
General Assembly. The TPB’s focus is set to assist states, upon their request, in legal and 
other aspects related to countering terrorism. In particular, its focus is expediting the 
ratification of the UN CT legal instruments, providing capacity building assistance to law 
enforcement officials, identification and dissemination of the best practices, raising 
awareness on CT activities, facilitating international cooperation in criminal matters 
pertaining to terrorism, and drafting legislation in compliance with the UN conventions 
and resolutions.114 The human resources available for the use of the TPB were 
considerably limited in its initial phases. A directorial, a legal expert, an administrative 
support person, and two general posts were granted to be added to the existing two mid-
level positions.115 The TPB has tried to expand its effectiveness through placing experts 
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in the field in the field offices of the UNODC.116 The TPB’s human resources can still be 
considered very scarce compared to other similar international agencies. Another 
important point in the organizational structure of the TPB and in general the UNODC is 
that these organizations heavily depend on the direct employment of their personnel 
following UN procedures instead of temporary secondments from member countries. 
They do not have a liaison role and represent their origin of nationalities.117 
 
Figure 3.   Organizational Structure of the UNODC118 
C. INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Horizontal and vertical exchange of information is at the core of any effective 
collaborative action. The UNODC/TPB has strived to maintain and facilitate the 
information exchange through seven channels: (1) diplomatic correspondences through 
the Offices of the Permanent Representatives to the UN of member states or their 
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Consular Offices located in Vienna, (2) UN field offices, (3) (rarely through) direct 
contacts, (4) international meetings, conferences, and similar events, (5) focused bulletins 
and reports (6) the Virtual Global Community of Criminal Justice Offers Dealing with 
Counter Terrorism network, and (7) (indirectly through) the I-ACT system.119 
There is no central command and communication center in the UNODC/TPB to 
coordinate the flow of information. Moreover, the UNODC’s mandate does not seek for 
the instant information exchange among the member states and the institution. The 
UNODC’s perspective on information exchange is rather on the dissemination of best 
practices and normative information to enhance the capacity of the criminal justice 
institutions of the member states. 
Created in March 2011, the Virtual Global Community of Criminal Justice 
Officers Dealing with Counter-Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the Virtual 
Community, is one of the most innovative and recent information exchange instruments 
employed by the TPB. The fundamental objective of the Virtual Community is to 
facilitate communication between the geographically distant criminal justice officers to 
strengthen the national and universal legal instruments against terrorism-related issues. 
The Virtual Community tool enables the practitioners and other relevant authorities to 
create networks with their counterparts, to meet UNODC experts, share good practices 
and engage “continuous learning.” The tool is also known as the UNODC Counter 
Terrorism Learning platform. Aside of its communication utility, the platform serves as 
an interactive online training instrument that is capable of providing tailor-made training 
programs to criminal justice officers across the world. As of August 2011, two six-week 
training programs were organized and the Virtual Community had helped to connect 
more than 369 criminal justice officers from 90 countries to discuss terrorism-related 
issues and share their knowledge.120 
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The I-ACT Initiative is the second electronic communications means that is 
indirectly utilized by the UNODC. The I-ACT Initiative was designed by the Counter 
Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the UN’s central unit tasked for 
coordinating and implementing the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, as a 
mechanism through which member states can directly deliver their assistance requests to 
the UN system via one focal point and receive timely customized assistance on terrorism 
related-issues.121 
Another way of communication is through the publication and dissemination of 
focused bulletins and reports on the recent terrorist incidents and investigations. The most 
noticeable example of these bulletins is the “Digest of Terrorist Cases” e-book. Mainly 
developed as a capacity building tool to strengthen the legal regimes against terrorism 
and legislative capacity of member states to address the terrorism from a criminological 
perspective, it also serves as a useful instrument by providing in-depth analysis on the 
best practices exercised by different countries all over the world.122 
In a similar vein, the UNODC/TPB published “The Criminal Justice Response to 
Support of Acts of Terrorism” book on November 22, 2011. Prepared in collaboration 
with the CTITF, this book presents the outcomes of two specialized expert working 
groups and the best practices on handling the victims of terrorism collected from different 
case studies all over the world. The publication includes recommendations to states on 
how to convey judicial assistance, protection from intimidation of and retaliation to 
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individuals as well as the material, psychological, and social assistance to the victims of 
terrorist incidents, and access to compensation.123 
The last but not least instrument of communication and information exchange is 
the numerous workshops, meetings, symposiums, and conferences either organized or 
participated in by the UNODC/TPB. Since the UNODC’s activities focus on capacity 
building and ad hoc assistance in terms of collaborative action, the UNODC/TPB 
organizes many international events throughout the year. At these events, criminal justice 
officers as well as officials at different levels from the governmental, non-governmental 
and scholarly communities can find opportunities to socialize and develop informal 
communication channels.  
Despite the lack of comprehensive data on provided training on the UNODC 
website, the available figures show that the TPB trained 1,700 criminal justice officials in 
11 regional workshops involving 82 countries in 2006.124 In 2007, the TPB offered 
training programs to more than 1,500 national criminal justice officials on the legal 
regime against terrorism.125 Similarly, in 2009 the UNODC/TPB supplied specialized 
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training to around 1,500 criminal justice officials and reached more than 140 countries 
through national or regional counter terrorism activities.126 
D. AD HOC ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
The UNODC/TPB’s role has been deliberately set to enhance the capacity of 
member states on the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases 
covering the five thematic areas of the TPB’s mandate.127 The UNODC/TDP has strived 
to modernize its assistance delivery means, utilize more digital and online solutions and 
put a special emphasis on the issues of the prevention of the internet for terrorist purposes 
and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.128 
The UNODC/TPB pays special attention to and puts considerable effort into 
training activities. The institution organizes numerous workshops and training seminars 
across the world. The UNODC Counter Terrorism Learning Platform is a very useful tool 
to deliver the training materials to the end users. Except for the training interfaces, the 
UNODC also develops its own training curriculums. The UNODC Counter Terrorism 
Legal Training Curriculum is a comprehensive curriculum that covers thematic issues on 
criminal issues such as the CBRN, transportation security, financing of terrorism, and the 
use of the internet for terrorist purposes. Additionally, some other supplementary training 
modules are offered in the curriculum such as money laundering and organized crime 
drawn from other specialized units of the UNODC.129 
Another useful database on the account of capacity building activities is the 
UNODC’s Terrorism Legislation Database tool. This tool was developed to assist 
member states to reach out to up-to-date data and legislative regulations that have been 
developed by the other member states. The Terrorism Legislation Database has two legs. 
First, the database is a searchable platform that provides access to the universal 
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legislative instruments against terrorism drawn from more than 145 countries along with 
their status of ratification. Second, member states can also have access to the model laws, 
legislation guides, and other legal tools that they can adapt to their own legal systems.130 
Aside from the direct counter terrorism capacity building initiatives, the 
UNODC/TPB has conducted other training activities on the criminal matters that are 
proven to be affiliated with terrorism. One of these issues that the TPB has been active in 
is the supervision and investigation of financial transactions. According to UNODC 
reports, some countries expressed their willingness to effectively inspect the financial 
transactions done through conventional and online banking systems but they lack the 
equipment, software, and knowledge to exercise these kinds of investigations. From this 
premise, the UNODC developed the “Government Office” or “go” software packages and 
disseminated to the requested states for better supervision of the financial transactions 
and to reveal the possible incidents of money laundering activities and financing of 
terrorism. The GOAML is the specific module and intelligence analysis system in that 
software package that is intended to be used by national Financial Intelligence Units to 
surface the links between money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 131 
The UNODC provided direct legal assistance to 54 countries in 2006,132 delivered 
the same kind of assistance to 52 states in 2007,133 and 65 countries during 2009.134 
These assistance services were provided by country visits or national, regional, or 
international level workshops. Through these programs and their affiliated activities, the 
UNODC/TPB has managed to reach more than 100 countries on average per year. 
Regional programs and initiatives have been an important component of the 
UNODC’s activities in attaining its institutional objectives. In 2008, the UNODC began 
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to develop five regional programs that are geographically customized in the regions of 
East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Africa, Caribbean, Central America, and the Balkans. 
135 Some of these programs do not directly address the terrorism problem but the other 
types of crime such as drug trafficking that are severe and intensify the terrorism 
problem. The “Breaking the Link in Afghanistan and the Region” is one of these projects 
that was designed to address the drug trafficking problem in Afghanistan and neighboring 
region. Carried out in the framework of the “Rainbow Strategy,” the UNODC intended to 
build a regional response to threats posed by Afghan opiates.136 The Rainbow Strategy is 
one of the most successful regional programs of the UNODC. Developed by the UNODC 
and exclusively funded by the Government of Canada, the strategy has resulted in several 
fruitful joint operational activities in the region that have reportedly indirect impacts on 
the financing of terrorism.137 
The project “Strengthening Capacity of the Legal and Law Enforcement 
Institutions in Preventing and Combating Money-Laundering and Terrorism Financing” 
is another regional program that exclusively focuses on preventing the financing of 
terrorism and combating money laundering in Vietnam and the West Africa region. The 
program was put into action by the UNODC and 300 investigators and law enforcement 
officers were trained in the region. As for the tangible outcome of this technical 
assistance activity, Vietnam now can meet most international standards pertaining to 
fighting against money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.138 
In order to strengthen the legislative capacity against terrorism in Africa, the 
UNODC conducted specialized training programs in the region and trained more than 
110 national criminal justice officials from 10 Western African countries. The ultimate 
objective of the training was to enable the member states in the region to elaborate their 
national legal systems to better address the terrorism problem in accordance with the 
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universal standards and regulations as well as increase the compliance and cooperation 
between states through extradition and mutual legal assistance practices.139  
Other regional programs that are conducted in West Africa, in the Caribbean and 
Central America, and in the Middle East and North Africa mostly concentrate on the 
measures against criminal activities other than terrorism. The most prevalent 
commonalities among these programs are the predominance of the drug-related criminal 
activities and the prevention of money laundering. Although the same methodologies 
could have been applied to terrorism, there is not sufficient data about the existence of 
such programs in the searched resources.140 
E. POLICY COORDINATION AND CONTRACTING  
The UNODC maintains its policy coordination power on the states from the 
binding nature of the UN membership. As discussed earlier, member states are supposed 
to inform the Secretariat about the contact information of their criminal justice 
institutions as the focal points of the UNODC’s activities. Moreover, national 
governmental agencies are compelled to follow the directions and guidance of their 
respective political authorities discretion expressed in the relevant political and 
diplomatic interactions. Therefore, in a broad concept, the UNODC’s contracting power 
can be considered as excessive and comprehensive including different aspects of 
governmental action. 
From 2002 to April 2011, 561 ratifications on the 12 fundamental international 
legal instruments against terrorism were undertaken by the member states that the TPB 
got in touch with. In the period of January 2003, the initiation date of the UN’s Global 
Project on Terrorism, to April 2011, 85 countries ratified all 12 international instruments, 
lifting up the number of total countries to 111. In a different formulation, only 20 
countries remained that signed fewer than six international instruments at the end of 
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2011, a drop of 78 countries as opposed to January 2003.141 As of April 2011, a total of 
168 countries have been assisted by the TPB and 79 of those have developed new counter 
terrorism legislations or revised their existing legal systems. In one way or another, 
11,500 criminal justice officers have benefited from the services and/or trainings offered 
by the UNODC/TPB.142 
The UNODC/TPB operates in close cooperation with many different international 
and regional organizations. Aside from being a strategic and operational partner to the 
UN CTITF, Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and CTC, the TPB also 
organizes and coordinates activities at the operational level with 11 international 
organizations, 23 regional organizations, and 36 training institutions across the world.143 
F. CONCLUSION 
Based on the available data, it is fair to argue that the UNODC and exclusively 
the TPB pool their energy and resources to tackle the legislative inconsistencies (policy 
coordination) between the UN member states and lack of capacity in complying with the 
UN mandate; the deficiencies in both are also recognized as the barriers to international 
cooperation in law enforcement.144 
The UNODC’s contribution in fighting against terrorism for national police 
agencies can be analyzed at strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, 
facilitating the ratification of the UN Conventions ease the efforts of administrative 
officers who are mostly working at headquarters and dealing with the planning, reporting, 
and communication activities. The operational personnel also have benefited the tailor-
made training activities since these programs have enabled them to reach out to obtain the 
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best practices around the world and introduce new ways to address local challenges. The 
evaluation reports prepared by the TPB show that the comprehensive face-to-face and 
online training programs have been highly appreciated by the recipient countries.145 
Overall, the UNODC can be deemed quite successful at a strategic level but somewhat 
dissatisfactory at the operational level. The UNODC, with its sound and sophisticated 
organizational structure, enriched material resources, and massive political backing, 
would have been more effective in addressing transnational terrorism at the operational 
level. 
The most salient accomplishment record of the TPB in coordination with the CTC 
is its role in promoting the significance of the UN’s CT legislative tools and expediting 
the ratification of these instruments. These accomplishments can be interpreted as the 
activities of the UNODC in the field of policy coordination and mostly hinge on the 
contracting power of the UN Charter. Those instruments have helped member states to 
overcome the barriers to cooperation due to having different legislative frameworks in 
terrorism-related matters and provided a legal platform to strengthen international 
cooperation. This common platform reportedly has enhanced the capabilities of national 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in preventing and responding to terrorism.146 
Although the utility of merely ratifying the conventions without studying the level of 
implementation of those said conventions is highly arguable, it can be suggested that the 
UNODC has partially managed to realize its objectives in terms of policy coordination. 
One important aspect where the UNODC has encountered difficulties is in the 
exchange of information. The absence of a dedicated information exchange system as 
well as the shortage of staff to deal with around-the-clock communication hampers the 
effectiveness of the organization. The aforementioned ineffectiveness of the UNODC can 
be explained by its dominant intergovernmental structure. In contrary to the other IPCOs 
analyzed in this project, there is no data that the UNODC has even considered to establish 
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a competitive interactive and vigilant information exchange system to provide instant 
data on the terrorism-related issues to its members.  
Notwithstanding that, although the training activities have been appreciated by the 
trainees, the number and scope of the trained personnel are relatively slim compared to 
the overall numbers of personnel working in these agencies. Additionally, the instant and 
actionable information on the daily tasks is more praised in many cases than the training 
received in the classes or on the computer. In other words, in the policing community 
accurate and timely information is considered as a must-have asset while training is a 
necessary but supplementary contribution. The means that are developed by the UNODC 
are more in a stationary nature and only a limited number of law enforcement officers can 
benefit from those services. By keeping the organization out of the discussions about the 
modalities of data collection and protection and relatedly political squabbling, the 
UNODC officials seem to save the professional autonomy of the organization while 
compromising on the relevancy of its services for the officials working on the ground. 
The UNODC’s intergovernmental structure precludes the institution’s ability to 
customize programs according to the requirements of local law enforcement agencies. As 
presented in the structure section of this chapter, most of the time states provide their 
contributions to be spent on specific programs. Moreover, since all the managerial posts 
are employed in a top-down manner, member states, and specifically the professionals in 
the managerial levels, almost have no direct say in the policies and strategies of the 
institution. This is an impediment for the organization to organize and implement 
activities that are more necessary from a professional standpoint. In the case of the 
UNODC, even though the member states’ police agencies generally possess political 
detachment to varying degrees, the organization’s intergovernmental structure avoids 
itself to fully operationalize its technical and professional capacity. This issue also 
undermines the effectiveness, functionality, and relevance of the organization for the 
member states.  
In order to maintain its relevance and to keep up with the competitive activities of 
regional initiatives, the UNODC has appealed to develop various regional programs to 
deal with terrorism as well as other criminal activities. Specialized training programs 
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have been the key in the UNODC’s comparative success in terms of international 
cooperation practices. The increase in the number of these activities since 2006 can be 
recorded as a success, since these types of programs are generally demanded, funded and 
politically embraced by the member states based on their expected benefits. Although 
most of the operational level activities have been carried out on criminal issues other than 
terrorism, these regional activities can constitute a strong basis to organize similar 
programs on CT. 
When the outcomes of this analysis are jointly assessed through the main 
argument of this thesis, it is safe to suggest that the global intergovernmental structure of 
the UNODC has disallowed the agency to truly undertake information exchange 
functions and impaired the feasibility of policy coordination activities. Political decision 
making seems to prevail over professional law enforcement assessments. Even though the 
agency has enjoyed exclusive contracting power, there were attempts to enforce the 
policy coordination mechanisms in a top-down manner instead of being embraced and 
demanded by the operational agencies. The increasing number of regional programs that 
are demanded and supported by the beneficiary countries also supports the argument that 
these programs have a higher value in the eyes of the member countries. The UNODC 
began to be more relevant and valuable for these countries especially after these regional 
programs, through which member countries acquired customized, sustainable, and 
meaningful benefits.  
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IV. EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE (EUROPOL) 
A. PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
The European Police Office (EUROPOL) is the central law enforcement agency 
in the European Union (EU) system to make Europe a safer place by providing the best 
possible support to the national law enforcement agencies of the EU member states (MS). 
EUROPOL also strengthens the cooperation among MS to prevent and combat serious 
international organized crime and terrorism.147 
In pursuing this vision, the EU hinges on three principles: (1) being a support 
center for law enforcement operations across the EU, (2) performing as a criminal 
intelligence clearinghouse, and (3) collecting and disseminating best practices and other 
relevant law enforcement expertise.148 
Information exchange and operational analysis is at the core of EUROPOL’s 
mandate. The whole system is designed to deliver the most possible accurate and timely 
information to the relevant law enforcement agencies in the EU system.149 
In 2010, the European Commission adopted the EU Internal Security Strategy 
document.150 This strategy also strengthened the previous role and mission of EUROPOL 
in maintaining the required services to the law enforcement agencies of the MS and 
facilitating the cooperation on the fight against international organized crime and 
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terrorism. Special emphasis is put on the disruption of criminal networks, prevention of 
terrorism, and security of cyberspace. These areas are exclusively covered by 
EUROPOL’s mandate, and EUROPOL is directed to attain these objectives through 
intelligence-led policing concept by strictly adhering to the rule of law and respecting 
universal human rights.151 
Transnational terrorism was set out as one of the priority areas of EUROPOL in 
the Europol Convention in 1995 by highlighting the need for an enhanced level of 
cooperation on terrorism-related matters.152 Indeed, although it was mentioned in the 
Maastricht Treaty,153 countering terrorism was not included in the first drafts of the cited 
convention. Inclusion of CT as a primary field of activity happened upon the initiatives of 
the Spanish government. Spanish officials advocated that EUROPOL cannot become a 
relevant and effective international law enforcement agency without counter terrorism 
duties in its mandate.154 
The most significant leap forward to cohere to the different counter terrorism 
efforts in the EU system was the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, which was 
adopted and put into effect in 2005. The strategy assigned specific tasks to EUROPOL 
around four implementing stages: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.155 
B. STRUCTURE, BUDGET, AND DECISION MAKING 
The foundations of countering terrorism through law enforcement cooperation in 
modern Europe go back to the 1970s. The Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and 
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International Violence group (TREVI) was established in 1975 by European police 
officials to exchange information on terrorism-related issues.156 
The next attempt in the same vein was the foundation of the Police Working 
Group on Terrorism (PWGT) in 1979, mostly influenced by the assassination of the 
British Ambassador to Ireland in 1976.157 Being an informal association of the Benelux 
countries in addition to Germany and the UK, this working group aimed to exchange 
criminal intelligence on Northern Irish terrorist groups. This informal network then 
expanded to comprise all EU MS plus Switzerland and Norway.158 The same group also 
served as the nucleus of the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG), which was formed after the 
9/11 attacks.159 
EUROPOL was initially conceived in the so-called Maastricht Treaty within the 
third pillar of the EU to harmonize and orchestrate the efforts of various European 
institutions that are handling issues on judicial matters, customs, and immigration.160 In 
1994, the organization started its operations with a limited capacity on illicit drug 
trafficking in Europe.161 Although EUROPOL was charged with counter terrorism 
activities in the 1995 Convention, the institution could only formulate its specific tasks 
just after the initiation of a specialized counter-terrorism preparatory group to define the 
roles and contributions of EUROPOL. In 1998, EUROPOL’s mandate was extended and 
elaborated to cover counter terrorism operations.162 
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The 9/11 attacks fundamentally changed the course and pace of CT activities in 
the EU. On September 20, 2001, several new measures against international terrorism 
were adopted by the European Council of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs 
(CMJHA). Beyond those measures, following the legacy of the PWGT, a specialized CT 
unit, namely the Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), was established within 
EUROPOL on November 15, 2001. The unit consisted of terrorism experts from law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies of the MS. After one year, this unit was placed 
under the Serious Crimes Department of EUROPOL. In 2004, following the Madrid 
bombings, the CTTF was reorganized as a separate entity within the EUROPOL 
hierarchy. The CTTF’s objectives are defined as to collect and analyze all relevant 
intelligence regarding the terrorism threat in Europe, and based on the operational and 
strategic analysis of the collected intelligence designate comprehensive threat 
assessments on active terrorist groups and individuals.163 
In terms of organizational structure and the distribution of regulatory power, 
EUROPOL can be considered as a hybrid organization. It involves both top-down, 
centralized foundational features and bottom-up, participatory operational practices. On 
one hand, EUROPOL was structured by the political entities within the legal frameworks 
of the overall EU system. On the other hand, the institution has managed to keep its 
professional organizational culture and bottom-up decision-making practices through the 
roles of representatives of MS in the executive circles of the organization who are 
selected from the national law enforcement agencies of the MS.164 
EUROPOL is accountable to the CMJHA and directed by a director and a 
management board. The Director of EUROPOL is appointed by the Council for a four-
year term and the Management Board is comprised of one senior law enforcement 
representative from each MS. The Director and the Management Board are jointly 
responsible for the daily operation and supervision of the institution. They adopt reports 
on EUROPOL’s activities and submit these reports to the CMJHA for political 
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implementation.165 Since 2010, EUROPOL’s democratic supervision has been 
maintained through the increased role of the European Parliament, in particular during 
the adoption of the budget and the council regulations pertaining to EUROPOL.166 
EUROPOL’s activities are also overseen by several internal and external 
supervisory bodies to ensure the lawful conduct of its operations. The Joint Supervisory 
Body, Data Protection Officer, Financial Controller, European Court of Auditors, Internal 
Audit Service, and Internal Audit Function perform their duties to guarantee that 
EUROPOL uses its resources in the most possible effective manner and operates in the 
legal realm.167 
Since 2010, EUROPOL’s budget had been constituted by the contributions from 
the MS based on their gross national income (GNI).168 This method was inevitably 
causing the major powers within the EU to insert more funds than the smaller states and 
have more leverage in EUROPOL. In 2010, EUROPOL became an EU agency with the 
new EUROPOL Convention and started to receive its funds directly from the EU’s 
general budget.169 
C. INFORMATION EXCHANGE  
Information exchange is the core business of EUROPOL. In EUROPOL, mainly 
four different information exchange systems (from this point forward referred to as 
interfaces) simultaneously exist and consistently operate. These interfaces are the 
Electronic Information System (IS or EIS in general) and its affiliated components such 
as EUROPOL National Units (ENUs) as well as other sub-databases and information 
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exchange channels such as SIENA and INFO-EX; the Liaison Bureau; the CTTF; and the 
Heads of EUROPOL National Units Group (HENU). 
EUROPOL was tasked with the building of a computerized system to collect 
information and a compatible and secure system to effectively communicate among the 
EU MS. The IS was contemplated to have three major components: (1) an information 
system, (2) an analysis system, and an (3) index system.170 
The initial information exchange system was codenamed as the Information 
Exchange System (INFO-EX), which was designed to maintain the swift and secure 
bilateral exchange of critical information back and forth between EUROPOL and 
ENUs.171 The most obvious practical advantage of such a system is the increased 
efficiency of communication among the MS and EUROPOL headquarters.172 
As the transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups improved their 
communication capabilities, EUROPOL also compelled to renew its information 
exchange system. Replacing INFO-EX, the Secure Information Exchange Network 
Application (SIENA) is the product of this evolution. Activated on July 1, 2009, this 
next-generation information exchange system was designed to be more user-friendly and 
put stricter controls on the confidentiality of sensitive and personal data. This 
development has reportedly helped to mitigate the concerns of some MS on the integrity 
of their data and encouraged them to share more “valuable” information. Moreover, 
SIENA was adjusted to interconnect not only the ENUs but also other EU law 
enforcement agencies and external cooperation partners of EUROPOL such as 
INTERPOL, Australia, Canada, Norway, and the U.S.173 
The effective functioning of EUROPOL’s information exchange systems depends 
on the efficiency of two other units, namely EUROPOL’s Operational Center and ENUs. 
Operating as a central hub and working around the clock to ensure the flawless 
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continuation of communication within EUROPOL, the Operation Center has a critical 
role. The Operation Center also provides support for policing in major events in the 
MS.174 The ENUs are also of great importance for EUROPOL’s activities. Formed in 
each MS, these units are jointly responsible for managing and supervising information 
flow with the Operation Center.175 
In 2000, in pursuance to the guidance of the 1995 Convention, EUROPOL 
officials decided to setup a specialized EUROPOL Information System (EIS) within, 
which all the relevant criminal intelligence and professional expertise can be stored. This 
IS was improved in 2005 to cover all criminal activities under EUROPOL’s mandate 
including terrorism.176 The primary objective of the EIS was to find cross matches 
amongst data pooled by different MS.177 The EIS was updated in 2010 to encourage MS 
to share more information, in particular sensitive information. Along with the new 
system, MS reached the ability to integrate EIS to their own national law enforcement 
systems and automatically upload data.178 
The EIS is also fed by two other EU systems, namely the EU Customs 
Information System and the FIDE (Identification File of Customs Investigations)179 that 
increase the accuracy and completeness of the criminal intelligence gathered from other 
sources.180 Under the EIS framework, there are numerous databases that contain sensitive 
personal information as well as operational and strategic analyses. The so-called 
Information and Knowledge Centers harbor extensive amounts of data on a wide span of 
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criminal issues.181 By 2010, these centers were then put together under the EU Center for 
Law Enforcement Expertise (EPE).182 
The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) is used to 
exchange information among experts on the disposal of explosive materials and provide 
training to relevant officials in MS and to third states.183 The European Bomb Data 
System (EBDS) is the more elaborated version of the EEODN, which provides instant 
intelligence on explosives, incendiary, and explosive devices along with the CBRN. The 
EBDS also includes databases for bombing incidents, libraries, and forums for experts.184 
Another similar web tool is the Crime Scene Website that was developed in 
collaboration with the European Network of Forensic Institutes (ENFSI). Launched in 
2008, the Crime Scene Website aims to facilitate information exchange on crime scene-
related issues that have a pivotal importance in criminal investigations.185 In order to 
effectively fight against terrorism and acknowledging the emerging importance of digital 
data in that field, EUROPOL established a Computer Forensic Network. Through this 
network, EUROPOL offers a high quality service to EU law enforcement agencies by 
efficiently processing and analyzing vast amounts of data in considerably short 
timeframes.186 
A more focused tool in countering terrorism is the Check-the-Web tool. This tool 
was specifically developed to share information on the use of the internet by radical 
Islamist terrorist groups.187 Check-the-Web and computer forensic tools were effectively 
used in the UK Greater Manchester Police Operation leading to the identification of an 
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extremist preacher who was planning terrorist attacks in Europe. His identification also 
revealed several other connections that were of great value for ongoing investigations.188 
The last counter terrorism-targeted IT tool is ATLAS. First offered in 2007, the 
main objective of ATLAS is to assist anti-terrorism units of the MS to collaborate and 
exchange their technical information.189 EUROPOL is working to incorporate the 
ATLAS Communication Platform into the EPE system.190 As of 2011, EUROPOL was 
preparing a joint terrorism database that covers all relevant areas in terrorism-related 
issues and integrate the outputs of different systems into a common knowledge pool 
including forensic analysis, biometrical information, and operational analysis.191 
Notwithstanding the advanced communication means, analysis lays in the core of 
intelligence-led law enforcement activities. With this perspective EUROPOL carries out 
two levels of analysis—at strategic and operational levels. EUROPOL’s analysis system 
observes three functions: “(1) centralization and management of information, (2) 
customized text-mining solutions, and (3) analytical capabilities through a wide range of 
analysis tools.”192 
In order to coherently undertake its analysis activities, EUROPOL developed the 
Overall Analysis System for Investigation Support (OASIS) in 2001. After several 
upgrades and modifications the system became fully active in 2007.193 
The Analysis Work Files (AWFs), probably the most important and earliest 
analysis tool of EUROPOL, run under OASIS. First introduced in 1999, AWFs are 
specialized investigation files that contain specified categories of relevant data on 
involved individuals.194 Modus Operandi Monitor is another analysis tool that 
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continuously screens and analyzes terrorist events and investigations that can affect 
security in Europe. The outcomes of this tool are cross-matched with MS law 
enforcement agencies’ investigations.195 
Two specialized counter terrorism programs were developed and activated by 
EUROPOL. The first one is the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, which was 
developed with the U.S. to verify the identities of designated providers in the EU. The 
ultimate objective of this project is to identify and pursue terrorist finances between the 
two sides of the Atlantic.196 
The other specialized program is on Maritime Piracy. Upon the resolution 
endorsed by the UN Security Council calling all members of the UN to work with 
EUROPOL and INTERPOL to eradicate piracy off the coast of Somalia, EUROPOL 
carries out investigations and focused analyses.197 
In terms of strategic analysis, the most concrete output of EUROPOL is the 
Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). These reports are unclassified 
documents prepared based on the information gathered from MS, open sources, and other 
EU agencies.198 Announced annually, EUROPOL informs the European Parliament and 
the Council on the latest trends and developments in terrorism-related issues. TE-SATs 
provide guidance to political decision makers and police executives both at the EU and 
national level to adjust their policies based on contemporary and predicted terrorist 
threats.199 
In relation to TE-SAT, the monitoring and analysis of open source intelligence 
(OSINT) has been proven to be useful in all counterterrorism activities of EUROPOL. 
EUROPOL pays attention to open source data mining and has provided access to relevant 
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data sources for its experts for years. The data collected from the open sources is 
classified in specific groups and is going to be integrated into the new Terrorism 
Database for the further use and analysis of law enforcement officers.200 
The Liaison Bureau of EUROPOL is the “human interface” of EUROPOL’s 
communication channels. Consisting of at least one liaison officer from all MS, the 
Liaison Bureau enables national law enforcement agencies to securely and swiftly share 
delicate intelligence. Moreover, the bureau brings significant flexibility to the system. In 
addition to that, information sharing was extended beyond continental Europe by the 
liaison officers of Australia, Canada, Croatia, Colombia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, 
INTERPOL, and the U.S. Even the U.S. is represented by several liaison officers working 
for different law enforcement agencies in the U.S. 201 
Another human interface of communication at the tactical and strategic level is 
the Heads of EUROPOL National Units group. Comprised of the senior officers from 
MS, the HENU group has been found to be fruitful in defining the strategic objectives of 
EUROPOL, tackling the barriers to cooperation and communication among ENUs, and 
giving guidance on the preparation of strategic analysis documents to be submitted to the 
political circles of the EU.202 
The Counter Terrorism Task Force is the more focused collaborative unit within 
EUROPOL that carries out strategic and operational level counter terrorism activities. 
The CTTF, which also can be counted as a human interface in communication, has been 
sporadically formed and disbanded.203 Reestablished after the 2004 Madrid attacks, the 
CTTF played a central role in the preparation of TE-SATs and several important AWFs. 
The more prominent of these AWFs are “Islamic Terrorism” on extremist Islamist 
terrorist groups and “Dolphin” on all other terrorist organizations. The CTTF also led 
several strategic analyses on the financing of terrorism, terrorist movements in Europe, 
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and an English-Arabic-English translation system for the analysis of written evidence in 
Arabic. 204 
D. AD HOC ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
Capacity building activities can also be divided into two groups: long-haul and 
more static capacity building assistance and case-based bilateral or multilateral capacity 
building activities. 
The first tool employed by EUROPOL is the Knowledge Management Center 
(KMC). The KMC contains contact information of the experts and institutions that 
possess rare and specific skills on infrequent and marginal criminal activities. The KMC 
helps law enforcement officials get in touch with the experts in overseas and avoids 
duplication of efforts and waste of resources. Although this tool resembles an information 
exchange mechanism, it is more of a stationary database as opposed to other analyzed 
information exchange mechanisms.205 
As in other IPCOs, training is also an important part of the capacity building 
activities in the EUROPOL structure. Training activities are handled in two levels: 
internal and external training. Whereas internal training activities mainly focus on 
increasing efficiency of the information management and exchange services, the external 
trainings that are offered to MS and non-MS as well as other international organizations 
cover a wide span of issues that fall into EUROPOL’s mandate and considered among the 
institution’s priority agenda issues.206 The training program on witness protection is an 
example of these training activities. Acknowledging the importance of human 
intelligence and lawfully gained information in the prosecution processes, EUROPOL 
organized a specialized program on witness protection. Educating the witness protection 
officers in the MS is an essential part of the project.207 
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Notwithstanding these long-term capacity building activities, EUROPOL does 
have an edge on ad hoc assistance programs and joint operations. In fact, this is the 
cornerstone that EUROPOL differentiates itself from the other IPCOs analyzed in this 
thesis. Although INTERPOL and the UNODC (specifically on drug trafficking) have 
some similar initiatives on joint operations and joint investigation teams, EUROPOL’s 
mechanisms go way beyond those mentioned activities.  
For instance, in 2007 EUROPOL conducted a joint operation under the French 
presidency and with the participation of more than 20 countries on the trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons. Almost all mechanisms of EUROPOL were used during 
this operation including on-the-spot information gathering and analysis teams. The 
gathered information was shared instantly with other operational counterparts in other 
countries.208 
In the same vein, in 2005 EUROPOL was involved in 40 counter terrorism 
investigations and provided operational support to MS law enforcement agencies. 
Additionally, EUROPOL mobilized special assistance teams to major sports and 
international events such as the 2006 Olympics in Turin and the FIFA World Cup 2006 in 
Germany.209 
The European Network of Advisory Teams (EuNAT) is a network comprised of 
advisory teams and crisis management groups that provides strategic and/or tactical 
guidance to law enforcement agencies of the MS, in particular on kidnapping, hostage 
taking, and extortion cases. The EuNAT maintains the linkage between EUROPOL’s 
advisory teams to convey the immediate support to MS in the cases of life-threatening 
risks posed by criminal or terrorist groups.210 
At the more operational level, EUROPOL utilizes its First Response Network 
(FRN). This network was developed to assist law enforcement agencies of MS in 
increasing their capacity to responding in a timely manner to terrorist attacks. A team of 
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EUROPOL and MS counterterrorism experts can be deployed immediately after a 
terrorist attack in any MS to provide the required technical and operational assistance.211 
The Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) of EUROPOL—the special investigation 
teams that are composed of national and other EU MS law enforcement officers headed 
by a national senior law enforcement officer with limited authority—are indeed the most 
robust and salient examples of EUROPOL’s operational capacity. In order to make 
EUROPOL “more than an intelligence broker,” the EU Council had deliberately stated 
and promoted the institution’s role in both the initiation of investigations in MS and 
setting up of JITs on those investigations.212 
The Schengen agreements enabled people and commodities as well as criminals 
to freely move in the European Union. The Amsterdam Treaty integrated all relevant 
treaties of the EU including the Schengen agreements into the EU Acquis 
Communautaire. The Amsterdam Treaty213 is also the first legal text of the EU that 
mentions JITs.214 Two years later in 1999 in the Tampere Summit,215 the EU adopted a 
more holistic approach on internal security and called for the creation of special 
investigation teams that conduct investigations across the EU territories.216 The Protocol 
amending the EUROPOL Convention217 confirmed the legal status of JITs and granted 
more authority to initiate, involve, and support criminal investigations within continental 
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Europe. 218 The latest legal regulation on the improvement of the capacities of JITs was 
made in 2008 by putting special emphasis on the roles of JITs in crisis situations.219 
E. POLICY COORDINATION AND CONTRACTING 
In 1995, EUROPOL was established as a regional transgovernmental agency to 
coordinate and facilitate international cooperation on criminal issues among the MS as 
well as third parties.220 EUROPOL’s mandate and its foundational documents have been 
amended on several occasions to adjust the organization in response to the changing 
environment.221 This reality has rendered a “patchwork” structure. Notwithstanding that 
structural issue, due to the internal regulations of the EU any amendment on the mandate 
or the procedures of EUROPOL is required go through a time-consuming ratification 
process. Moreover, financing the organization through MS contributions based on their 
GNIs poses several challenges. 
In order to overcome these impediments, the European Council adopted a new 
decision on April 6, 2009, to incorporate EUROPOL into the EU’s general framework as 
an EU agency. With this new setting, which came into effect as of January 1, 2010, it was 
intended to lessen the bureaucratic procedures in adapting the organization to the 
environment and fund the organization directly from the EU budget. This new regulation 
also aimed to align the organization in a better sense with other EU agencies and increase 
the democratic auditing of its expenditures through EU financial control mechanisms.222 
Even before this new regulation, EUROPOL has had significant influence on the 
policy determination both at the EU and state levels. EUROPOL possesses the ability and 
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enjoys the opportunity to transmit its recommendations and strategic analyses to the 
political circles of the EU.223 The EUROPOL Director and the Management Board have 
direct access to the CMJHA members. Moreover, the democratic administration 
mechanisms of the organization via the representation of all MS at the executive level 
and the communication of these members with their own political authorities help 
EUROPOL to remain relevant and important for the MS as well as aligning its policies 
based on the political and technical requirements of MS.224 EUROPOL's semi-
autonomous structure helps it to harmonize and coordinate policies across the states. 
Beyond their practical utilities, the formation of JITs was alone a great leap 
forward in terms of policy cooperation. The theoretical discussions on the JITs relate to 
the monopoly of a state on the legitimate use of a nation state on its own soil. It is a fact 
that EU member states compromise some portion of their sovereignty by allowing foreign 
nationals to conduct criminal investigations in their own territories. The JITs can be 
considered as the most successful outcome of EUROPOL in coordinating policies at the 
EU level.225 
EUROPOL also seeks ways for enhancing its cooperation with third parties. The 
fundamental tools used to attain this goal are strategic and operational agreements. As of 
2012, EUROPOL has operational agreements with seven non-EU states and strategic 
agreements with 10 non-EU States. In addition to that, EUROPOL signed an operational 
agreement with INTERPOL and has been a strategic partner of the World Customs 
Organization and the UNODC.226 
EUROPOL’s influence on policy coordination among MS also hinges on its 
connections with other EU agencies and EU bodies. The Eurojust, the legal and judiciary 
cooperation agency of the EU, is the foremost important operational partner of 
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EUROPOL. The other significant strategic partners such as FRONTEX, European Police 
College (CEPOL), European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, and the 
European Anti-Fraud Office collectively and mutually impact both each other’s and, in 
general, the European Union’s political calculus.227 
F. CONCLUSION 
As presented so far, EUROPOL is the central law enforcement agency of the EU 
with a comprehensive mandate and the organization receives a considerable amount of 
political and material backing from both the EU and member states. Though EUROPOL 
is structured within the legal frameworks of the EU in a top-down manner, its roots can 
be traced back to the peer-to-peer relations among European law enforcement agencies. 
Therefore, it would be fair to argue that EUROPOL has a hybrid organizational structure, 
a delicate combination of carrying both intergovernmental and transgovernmental 
features. Inheriting the legacy of TREVI and the entrenched police cooperation culture of 
the European police agencies, EUROPOL has been able to come up with widely accepted 
and used operational and strategic counter terrorism measures. 
 In terms of professional autonomy and guidance retrieved from political 
authorities, Deflem argues that EUROPOL enjoys a significant level of professional 
autonomy in determining its strategic and tactical objectives while simultaneously guided 
by the political circles of MS and EU decision-making mechanisms.228 There was also a 
tradeoff for EUROPOL between increasing its legitimacy, accountability, and material 
resources through a better integration into the EU system and compromising the 
professional control on the organization and its “club-like” organizational culture.229 The 
strategic decision of the EU Council to reorganize EUROPOL as an EU agency might be 
both an opportunity and a threat for the organization. Similar to INTERPOL, this 
strategic change can provide plenty of sustainable resources to the organization while 
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hampering its professional autonomy. Nevertheless, there is no indication that 
EUROPOL is going to fully deprive itself of its professional autonomy. The well-
established decision-making structures within EUROPOL help it to focus on the most 
important security issues from a law enforcement perspective. On the other hand, close 
connections between the executive board of EUROPOL and the political centers of the 
EU and member states enable the organization to operate efficiently while maintaining 
the delicate balance of political guidance vis-á-vis professional autonomy.  
Measuring the effectiveness of EUROPOL’s counter terrorism activities is quite 
difficult because EUROPOL is overly protective and restrictive in communicating its 
operational activities to the public. There is very limited data either on the operations of 
the organization or the effectiveness analyses of EUROPOL.230 Nevertheless, when the 
services offered by an IPCO are considered in business terms and on the economic 
principle of supply vs. demand, the mere existence of the aforementioned programs and 
IT tools can be counted as mediocre evidence of the fruitfulness of these services and 
their admission by the beneficiaries. Moreover, some studies done through interviews 
with practitioners argue that EUROPOL’s services are widely used by MS law 
enforcement agencies and have led to many CT operations in Europe.231 
The significance of information exchange mechanisms accompanied with 
sophisticated means and procedures to collect and disseminate information are the most 
significant contributions of EUROPOL to its member states’ police agencies in 
countering terrorism. The peer-to-peer professional and democratic settings in 
articulating the priority areas and the operational methodologies have not only facilitated 
the orchestrated response to terrorism-related issues but also enhanced the agency’s 
relevance and acceptance among its constituent law enforcement agencies. Devising a 
unique human interface for communication has led EUROPOL to mitigate possible 
mistrust issues and brought flexibility and efficiency in sharing information. The special 
emphasis on the protection of the data provided by the members also seems to encourage 
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European law enforcement agencies to share more valuable data with the organization. 
Moreover, the advanced technological infrastructure that integrates EUROPOL and 
national law enforcement databases and maintains communication channels to the lowest 
level operatives 24/7 has increased the effectiveness and relevance of the organization. 
On the flip side, EUROPOL receives some severe criticisms on its efficiency and 
effectiveness. Most of these critiques are on the technical problems that law enforcement 
officers encounter during the operations and information exchange processes. One of 
these critiques is about the linguistic problems in the communication. In EUROPOL, all 
information should be translated into EU languages (as of 2012, 13 languages) before 
disseminated to the ENUs. 232 Nonetheless, linguistic and cultural diversities are known 
as common barriers to law enforcement cooperation and it would be relatively easier to 
overcome this problem in a regional organization than a universal one.233 Moreover, 
centuries long common history and interactions can also mitigate the negative 
consequences of cultural and linguistic differences. 
The main disturbance about EUROPOL’s effectiveness is the defective flow of 
information among and between the MS and EUROPOL. Even in 2008, after several 
modifications and upgrades of the EIS, European law enforcement officers complained 
about the lack of valuable data coming from EUROPOL channels.234 From another 
perspective, the result of the low quality or slim amount of data would not be the flaws in 
EUROPOL’s system. Since it gathers its information mostly from MS domestic databases 
and criminal analyses, when the MS grow some sort of distrust and refrain from sharing 
information, EUROPOL has no other alternative but relying on open source data and 
other secondary information resources.235 
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The refusal of Spanish authorities to share intelligence with French officials after 
the Madrid bombings can be considered as an example of the shortfalls of the EUROPOL 
system in CT. 236 Moreover, the political quarrel about the nationality of the next 
EUROPOL Director in the wake of the Madrid bombings exemplifies how the national 
sentiments and political agendas can be interpreted as the natural consequences of 
intergovernmental relations, undermining the effectiveness of police cooperation 
organizations.237 
Conversely, there were some other “purely” technical level police initiatives at the 
same time to find a remedy to the terrorism problem among the law enforcement agencies 
of the EU. For instance, several meetings after the Madrid bombings were held. In 
Dublin, The European Chiefs of Police Task Force came together with the representatives 
from INTERPOL, Norway, and Iceland to discuss the latest attacks and future challenges. 
Therefore, when all these available information is collectively evaluated, it can be argued 
that EUROPOL cannot be solely blamed for its mentioned relative ineffectiveness. Most 
of the time, political quarrel and squabbling of states have played the decisive role in 
determining the effectiveness of EUROPOL.238 
EUROPOL has partly lent the policy coordination function to the upper EU 
institutions. The European Union doubtlessly serves as a very strong political body and 
exercises considerable authority on its member states. Indeed, the key value of 
EUROPOL on the account of policy coordination stems from its regional and 
transgovernmental structure. For instance, the JITs stand as a good example of how sub-
state units can realize a need for advanced cooperation, prepare the required 
implementing structures, and submit this framework to the political circles of the EU to 
be incorporated into the EU legislation. Another utility of EUROPOL in terms of policy 
coordination is its interregional relations with third party international/regional 
organizations and non-member states. The data shows that some states like Turkey or 
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regional organizations such as the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center 
(SELEC) engage in law enforcement cooperation activities with EUROPOL to expedite 
their integration with the EU.  
In all the three dimensions that the author analyzes to determine the effectiveness 
of EUROPOL, he concludes that EUROPOL attains most of its strategic and operational 
goals. EUROPOL’s most significant success would be its sophisticated, advanced, and 
secure communication channels. The scope and comprehensiveness of the databases 
offered by EUROPOL along with the analysis tools are invaluable resources. 
Notwithstanding that, the human interface of communication has been another facilitator 
in information exchange. EUROPOL’s hybrid structure in terms of structural relations 
has helped the organization to create an operational environment in which its constituent 
agencies have efficiently exchanged information and shaped their policies in line with 
each other. This hybrid structure and continuous contacts with the policy-making circles 
have enabled EUROPOL to gain required material resources to be used in capacity 
building activities. The cooperative action in a regional context has also been helpful in 
overcoming cultural, geographic and to some extent linguistic barriers to operational 
action and policy coordination activities.  
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V. SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER 
(SELEC)239 
A. PURPOSE AND STRATEGY 
The year of 1989 was a sharp turning point especially in the history of Eastern 
and Southeastern European countries. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Communist regimes in Southeast Europe, the nations of the region 
found themselves amidst economic, political, and military conflicts. On one hand, being 
geographically located in the intersection of the Middle East, Eurasia, and Europe and on 
the other hand, the catastrophic economic conditions and unstable political environment 
rendered the region as a considerably fertile area for any sort of criminal activity 
including terrorism. 
Conceiving the emerging threat in the region and its projected ramifications, in 
1996, European countries and the U.S. took the initiative and jointly initiated the 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) as a literally “initiative” and a forum 
with an extremely loose structure to complement the existing regional cooperative 
activities on the common problems.240 One of the earliest and most tangible outcomes of 
the SECI was the establishment of the SECI Regional Center on Transborder Crime 
(hereinafter referred to as “SECI Center” or “Center”) in 1998 upon the proposed project 
“Prevention and Combating Trans-border Crime” and was actively supported by the U.S. 
Ambassador Richard Schifter.241 One year later, the mentioned proposal was embodied 
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in the “Agreement on Co-operation to Prevent and Combat Trans-border Crime”242 and 
10 countries signed the Agreement as the first members of the Center.243  
The ultimate goals of the SECI Center were to encourage law enforcement 
agencies of MS to cooperate on the criminal issues in the region; to analyze criminal 
activities and disseminate the actionable intelligence among the MS; and to facilitate the 
integration of the South East European (SEE) countries into the European System.244 The 
law enforcement concept is interpreted in a dual structure and as not merely the police 
agencies of the MS but also including customs authorities. 
Counter terrorism issues were not explicitly regulated in the initial foundational 
documents. However, the 9/11 attacks sparked and fueled the “felt need” of the 
cooperation on terrorism-related issues. Acknowledging that the traditional CT 
instruments and strategies were not effective and sufficient, on September 14, 2001, the 
SECI Center issued the “Bucharest Declaration on the Suppression of Terrorism”245 and 
expedited its studies on terrorism.246 The Declaration outspokenly encourages MS to 
exchange information on terrorism-related issues and holding a law enforcement 
perspective, specifically focusing on the nexus between criminal activities and terrorism. 
With this intention, the Center reorganized its task force (TF) structure in 2003 
and formed the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) with two sub-task forces that had 
been separately operational: TF on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and TF on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).247 Due to the several constraints that will be 
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presented, the objectives of the ATTF are relatively modest. The main objectives of the 
TFs are to organize events and develop means for the sharing of best practices; to set up a 
network of National Contact Persons on CT issues; to conduct training activities; and to 
provide strategic and operational analysis documents.248 The ATTF strives to accomplish 
its designated goals via two operational instruments of the Center: direct information 
exchange and TF activities.249 
B. STRUCTURE, BUDGET, AND DECISION MAKING 
The SECI Center has continued to evolve and respond to the environmental 
changes in the international context. The organization’s initially crafted shell began to be 
tighter and insufficient to govern the steadily increasing operational activities. Therefore, 
beginning in 2007, the MS started to discuss reforming the organization with a series of 
updates and amendments. The Convention of the Southeast European Law Enforcement 
Center was opened for signature on December 9, 2009.250 The Convention was ratified 
by all member states and the SELEC finally became operational on October 7, 2011. 
Inheriting all of the priority agenda issues of the SECI and also elaborating some 
technical, administrative, and operational matters, the SELEC Convention became the 
“new” foundational document of the organization.251 
The new Convention has highlighted several key points to enhance the 
effectiveness of the organization in general terms. A special emphasis was put on 
maintaining flexibility and operational effectiveness on one hand, and continuing to 
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provide accurate and timely strategic and operational analysis on the other hand. 
Notwithstanding that, the significance of data protection in line with the EU standards, 
the need for advanced computerized information and communication systems, and the 
obtained international legal personality are recognized and appropriate instruments 
embedded in the aforementioned Convention.252 
The SECI Center operates with a comparatively simple organizational structure 
and with a small operational, administrative, and advisory staff. The highest decision-
making organ of the organization is the Council, formerly the Joint Cooperation 
Committee (JCC), which is comprised of two high level national members from the 
police and customs authorities of the member states. Currently, 13 countries are in the 
Council and it is presided by a chairperson selected annually from a MS in alphabetical 
order; the Council convenes intermittently and selects the SELEC administration for two-
year terms.253 The Council requires acquiring consensus of all MS on some foundational 
issues, but in other cases two-thirds of the majority is sufficient to make a decision.254 
The organizational structure of the organization is shown in Figure 4. 
The organization is administered by a Director General and two Directors for 
Operational and Legal/Internal Directorates. Under the Operational Directorate, TFs and 
Liaison Officers (LOs) handle the daily information exchange activities and scheduled 
cooperation activities on the specific crime areas. Each member state has the right to 
assign two LOs, one from customs and another from the police agencies. As of 2012, 17 
LOs serve from 13 MS in the SELEC.255 These LOs maintain information exchange 
among the SELECs, requesting MS and National Focal Points (NFPs). The NFPs are the 
dedicated offices in each MS that collect and divert information requests and responses 
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within the countries.256 As of 2012, there are eight TFs working on a wide span of 
criminal issues that are prevalent and common in the region.257 
 
Figure 4.   Organization Structure of the SELEC258 
The SECI Center and then the SELEC has managed to increase its visibility in the 
international arena and attracted many countries’ interests. As of 2012, 13 countries259 in 
the region have signed and ratified the SELEC Convention. Notwithstanding these states, 
there are also 17 observer countries260 all over the world and 5 international 
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organizations.261 In addition to these observer states and institutions, INTERPOL and the 
WCO have permanent observer status in the organization. 262 
The budget of the SELEC is primarily maintained by the annual MS payments. 
The Center is also financed partly through external sources and sponsorships. Turkey and 
Greece has been the major funders. However, especially in the initial periods of the 
organization, the U.S. provided almost half of the organization’s annual budget.263 
Moreover, the U.S. endowed technical equipment and furnished the SECI Center’s 
headquarters.264 The headquarter premises are located in Bucharest, Romania, and 
granted by the Romanian government as a direct contribution with a HQ agreement.265 
The annual payments of MS can usually cover the routine operations of the Center and 
the Center has had to seek for additional funding for its TF activities and infrastructure 
enhancements. Nevertheless, by all means it is safe to state that the SELEC’s budget is 
comparatively slim and restricted.266 
C. INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Information exchange is the primary field of activity of the SELEC. As stated in 
its foundational documents and demonstrated by its operational track, the SELEC firstly 
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aims to facilitate communication among the law enforcement agencies of MS.267 As cited 
before, the SELEC utilizes two main information exchange methods: LOs and task 
forces. These “human-interfaces” of communication are attempted to be supported with 
secure and reliable electronic communication services. Although the SELEC has a secure 
electronic communication system working behind the firewalls and through an encrypted 
VPN as well as an intranet system for internal communication, it is no match to the 
information systems of similar IPCOs. The SELEC does not possess an automated 24/7 
information exchange system that can receive/respond online queries from the MS. 
Instead, the Center has signed the Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs) with 
INTERPOL and some other major international law enforcement cooperation 
organizations to get access to their systems.268 
One of the key elements of the SELEC’s information exchange system is the 
National Single Point of First Contact (National Focal Point-NFP). These focal points are 
not necessarily expert units to provide requested information with their own capacity but 
instead they serve as a clearinghouse for the incoming and outgoing messages and 
maintain the fast and proper transmittance of information within the MS.269 
The Liaison Officers network stationed in the HQ is another important component 
of the system. There are no dedicated CT liaison officers in the SELEC, but the LOs are 
tasked to maintain communication with the NFP or in some cases directly with the 
relevant authority in their own country. These LOs are also the project managers of the 
TFs. They are expected to draft the necessary documents for TF activities and carry out 
other preparatory activities for the seamless functioning of TFs.270 
The SELEC has acknowledged the importance of confidentiality and security of 
shared intelligence. With this respect, the SELEC has adopted several rules and principles 
and taken several measures to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information. A 
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special data protection officer is employed to oversee and regulate the information 
flow.271 According to the rules of the SELEC, requesting MS have to assign the same 
level of confidentiality on the information that is provided by another country.272 
The ATTF is the specialized TF on terrorism-related issues in the SELEC 
structure. Established in 2003 and coordinated by the Turkish National Police, the ATTF 
is comprised of two sub-task forces. The TF on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the 
TF on Weapons of Mass Destruction were initiated and coordinated by Albania and 
Romania, respectively. After the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and the Bucharest Declaration, 
the SECI MS came to the understanding that the Center needed a better and orchestrated 
structure to deal with terrorism. In 2002, Turkey announced its readiness and willingness 
to lead and coordinate such a TF in the SEE region.273 The primary goals of the TF are to 
find and analyze information on the terrorist groups that pose a security threat in the 
region and also unravel the nexus between terrorist groups and criminal organizations.274 
The ATTF organizes workshops and operational meetings to discuss the terrorist trends 
and debrief the terrorism experts of the SELEC member states.275 Terrorist financing has 
become one of the primary agenda issues of the task force. The TF has been convening 
workshops and targeted meetings on the addressing of terrorist financing in the region.276 
The first operational activity of the ATTF was conducted upon the request of the 
U.S. Secret Service in October 2001. In order to identify the bank accounts that were 
suspected of financing terrorism in the SEE region, an FBI watch list was disseminated to 
the MS and in return some suspicious bank accounts and transactions were detected in 
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Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Turkey.277 In February 2002, another arguably 
indirect operational accomplishment of the ATTF was the preparation and dissemination 
of an analytical report on the movement of refugees and illegal immigration from conflict 
areas, focusing on the Afghanistan and neighboring regions, to Europe.278 
The SALW TF has been one of the most vibrant and beneficial TFs in countering 
terrorism. Addressing the smuggling of light weapons and explosives in the region, the 
SALW intends to deprive terrorist groups of the instruments to commit terrorist attacks. 
The SALW was established in 2002 and in its first year reported 60 criminal 
investigations and 91 small arms seizures in the MS. Additionally, approximately 20,000 
rounds of ammunition and different types of explosives were captured in different 
operations.279 
In 2005, the SALW coordinated a very successful undercover operation 
codenamed “Plowshare” on the trafficking of small weapons. After an initial undercover 
purchase, the operation was continued to discover other nodes in the criminal network. 
The operation led to the arrest of 17 individuals and the discovery of several smuggled 
weapon warehouses in the neighboring countries. Important amounts of weapons and 
ammunitions including anti-tank missile launchers and explosives used to prepare IEDs 
were seized.280 In 2010, a SECI- coordinated operation on the smuggling of light 
weapons resulted in the arrests of three people and the seizure of 2 kg of explosives, 16 
guns, two rifles, a machine gun, and hand grenades.281 
The SELEC also offers another indirect contribution to CT activities. The 
Container Security Task Force, established in 2005 and coordinated by the Hellenic 
Customs and Excise Duties (Greece), is the only one of its kind in international law 
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enforcement practices. Recognizing the fact that the majority of the SELEC members 
have sea ports that are actively involved in containerized shipments and there is a 
possibility these containers could be used to smuggle illegal commodities and human 
beings including the CBRN and WMD for terrorist activities, this TF works to better 
supervise and control the containerized shipping activities in coordination with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.282 Operation “Secure Ark” was conducted in 2008, 
specifically targeting to detect and deter at import or transit, by sea or land WMD and 
CBRN substances as well as other terrorism-related materials. 283 
The analysis of the information on terrorism-related issues is among the 
objectives of the ATTF. In this regard, three types of activities have been carried out by 
the ATTF. The first one is the routine analysis report drafted and debriefed in 
prescheduled workshops and meetings. Secondly, the ATTF prepared the booklet on 
“Counterterrorism Experiences of SECI Member Countries” and disseminated it in the 
“5th Anti-Terrorism Task Force Meeting and Regional Workshop on Countering Terrorist 
Financing.” The booklet is comprised of elaborate information on CT best practices, 
structures and legal frameworks of the SELEC MS, and the booklet offers in-depth 
analysis of the trends and further steps to strengthen the response against terrorism.284 
The last analysis tool is the “Common Organized Crime Threat Assessment in SEE 
Region (OCTA-SEE).” This analytical report was first prepared in 2009 to fill in the 
intelligence vacuum between the EU and SEE regions, of which the former was 
elaborately and critically analyzed by OCTA and TE-SAT reports. The EU, and in 
particular EUROPOL, assisted the preparation of the OCTA-SEE.285 Although the 
OCTA-SEE is predominantly an analytical tool on the situation of organized crime threat 
in the SEE region, in the 2010 edition a special chapter is spared for the connection 
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between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations in the region.286 Although yet 
not prepared, the OCTA-SEE exemplifies the parallel alignment of strategic and 
operational objectives of the EU and SELEC. Based on this alignment, it would be safe to 
expect that a similar analysis can also be conducted on terrorism-related issues in the 
SELEC taking the TE-SAT as a model. 
D. AD HOC ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
In terms of capacity building activities and ad hoc assistance, the SELEC has not 
been able to offer so much to the MS. That is partly because of the limited amount of 
resources that can be pooled by the MS into SELEC activities. Notwithstanding that, as 
discussed before the funding of the organization is not so predictable and TF activities 
mainly rely on the coordinator countries’ own planning. 
Nevertheless, the SELEC premises offer fairly good and sufficient facilities for 
training activities. Since the inception, the Center has provided many unilateral and joint 
training programs to the HQ staff and practitioners from the MS. Aside from the trainings 
conducted in the HQ, TF coordinators also organize targeted trainings in their own 
countries.  
For instance, in 2003 the SELEC organized a seminar on WMD in collaboration 
with the FBI and a course on SALW and Criminal Firearms Intelligence Course in 
Bucharest, Romania.287 In 2004, Turkey hosted a training course on Terrorism, Strategies 
in Combating Terrorism, Investigations of Terror Events, and Intelligence. In the same 
year, another training program was carried out on Bomb Disposal Techniques for six 
weeks in Ankara.288 In 2008, Turkey provided a specialized program to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Special Operations teams on rescue operations of hijacked planes in Ankara, 
Turkey.289 
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The Task Force on WMD organized a crisis response simulation exercise in 2007 
against a WMD-caused threat in the Black Sea region. The five-day long exercise was 
organized jointly with the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted using 
videoconference technology. During the exercise, the participants reportedly found the 
chance to test national and international command post procedures.290 
Beside training activities, the SELEC’s most salient ad hoc contribution to the CT 
activities in the SEE region is its “Witness Protection Program.” Witness testimony is of 
great value in the prosecution of organized criminal activities and terrorist organizations, 
both of which specifically pay attention to operational security and adeptly use electronic 
communication means to not leave any traces. Thereof, the SELEC initiated a specialized 
witness protection program to protect, assist, transport, and facilitate the testifying 
procedures of witnesses. The program was first used in the abovementioned undercover 
operation and one individual was taken into the program. The transportation and security 
of the witness as well as the testifying of him through a videoconference system was 
provided by the SECI Center.291 
E. POLICY COORDINATION AND CONTRACTING  
The SELEC’s direct influence on the political decision-making circles of the MS 
is relatively slim. It should be underlined that neither the Convention signed by the MS 
nor the MoUs with third parties impose any kind of legal obligation on the signatory 
parties. In terms of data protection and confidentiality, although the SELEC adopts 
specific rules and procedures and refers to the Council of Europe Convention on Data 
Protection, the SELEC does not have any authority to enforce the ratification of exclusive 
data protection legislations or the establishment of personal information databases in the 
MS.292 
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Throughout its short history, the Center has strived to overcome this impediment 
by expanding its outreach to and cooperative activities with other credible international 
organizations. By granting permanent advisor positions to INTERPOL and the World 
Customs Organization (WCO), the Center has managed to increase its visibility and 
prove its relevance as an important player in the law enforcement arena.293 
If cooperating with INTERPOL and the WCO is considered as a vertical 
expansion of outreach, the SELEC has also extended its influence diagonally by getting 
in touch with the South East European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG). The 
Center supported the activities of SEEPAG to tackle the problems originating in the 
international law enforcement cooperation realm due to incompatible and different legal 
procedures. 294 It would be argued that this kind of cooperation has enhanced the role and 
influence of the Center on the jurisdictional circles of the MS who have hypothetically 
more influence and say on the political agendas of their respective countries. Another 
similar cooperative activity was implemented with the Regional Cooperation Council 
(RCC), a political, regional cooperation organization in the SEE region.295 
The Center has also carried out formalized professional cooperation activities 
with other regional law enforcement cooperation organizations such as the Central Asian 
Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) and research institutes like the 
UN Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).296 
The SELEC as an idea and its operational activities have been praised by many 
high level officials around the world, but the EU and the U.S. have given special 
importance to the SELEC. Beside the Ministers of Interior of MS, dignitaries such as the 
Directors of EUROPOL and FBI, the Undersecretary of U.S. Homeland Security, and the 
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General Director of French National Police have paid visits to the SELEC HQ and 
highlighted the important role of the organization.297 
Probably the most important role of the SELEC in shaping and harmonizing 
different policy choices of the SELEC MS is in its part of facilitating the integration of 
MS to the EU. The EU has helped the SELEC to enhance its capacity, recognizing the 
fact that the SEE region is an inseparable and significant part of the future EU. In order to 
maintain the smooth and satisfactory integration of the SEE countries in line with the 
third pillar of the EU, the SELEC has a leading role, though indirect and hindered due to 
the resource-wise limitation. 
In addition to that, the European Commission experts clearly stated in one of their 
evaluations on the Center that the SELEC MS are in the “front-line of every major area of 
crime which is ultimately targeted for the EU; it is therefore in the best interest of the 
European Union to support the SECI Center.”298 The criminal and terrorist threat 
originating from the region render an impetus and constitute complex interdependencies 
to mutually reinforce and assist each other. When considered in terms of policy 
coordination on CT-related issues, these interdependencies and the leading role of the 
SELEC as a facilitator of integration increase the importance of the SELEC and its policy 
recommendations on the MS.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The available data on the effectiveness of the SELEC’s counter terrorism efforts 
and the literature on the terrorism situation in the SEE region reveal some important 
points. First of all, it should be noted that the SECI Center or SELEC is a success at the 
ideological level; bringing the countries together that have entrenched fairly fresh 
military and ethnical grievances to orchestrate their efforts in countering terrorism is a 
fairly difficult task. Second, although the Center is still in its nascent periods where it 
requires a lot of effort and resources to be in the same league with the other IPCOs 
                                                 
297 SECI Center 2004 Annual Activity Report (Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, April 2005), 17, 
http://www.secicenter.org/p221/Activity_Report_on_2004. 
298 Ibid., 18. 
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analyzed in this thesis, some of its programs have been comparatively quite successful. 
Third, the Center has made good use of the lessons learned in terms of international 
cooperation in law enforcement as creating a well-functioning human interface for 
communication. In relation to that, the democratic decision-making and transparent 
governance methods lay an incentive for the law enforcement agencies of the SELEC MS 
to more actively participate in the SELEC’s activities. Fourth, partly due to the 
significance given by the U.S. and the EU, the SELEC has managed to prove its 
relevance as a facilitator and a mediatory of integration with the Western world. In 
general terms, it can be argued that the SELEC has been most successful on coordinating 
policies in the region due to its aforementioned granted role as a facilitator and as a 
“yardstick” to gauge the willingness of the member states to align their policies with the 
EU and the U.S. 
Utilizing a human interface of communication, the SELEC has managed to render 
a reliable and efficient information exchange structure. Although its readily available 
information exchange system is no match to either INTERPOL’s or EUROPOL’s, the 
collegial relationships among the LOs located in the SELEC headquarters have yielded 
quite successful outcomes, especially on crimes other than terrorism. One of the most 
interesting implications of transgovernmental relations within the SELEC is its unique 
and comprehensive approach to law enforcement cooperation as bringing together the 
customs and police agencies under the same roof. Acknowledging that these two 
agencies’ work mutually reinforces their overall effectiveness, the SELEC conveys a 
different and idiosyncratic approach to international law enforcement cooperation. 
For a better understanding of the SELEC’s effectiveness on CT, one should take a 
glance at the terrorist threat in the region. In overly simplified terms, terrorist threat 
originated from or affecting the SEE region is threefold: (1) a possible source of terrorist 
financing due to low governmental control and being located in the conjunction of major 
trafficking routes for a diverse list of illegal commodities that are either targeted to or 
originated from Western Europe, (2) a sanctuary and safe haven for the radical Islamist 
terrorist groups for preparation or recuperation, and (3) intra-regional transnational 
terrorist activities as an outcome of deep-seated ethnic, religious and/or political disputes. 
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There seems to be a disagreement between the political and law enforcement 
authorities of different states in the region on the significance or even existence of a 
terrorist threat in the SEE region. Some argue that in general terms economic deficiencies 
and organized crimes instead of terrorism are way more prevalent in the region. The 
proponents of this argument refrain from active participation in the CT activities within 
the SELEC framework by denying the existence of terrorist activities in their 
countries.299 Some others, nonetheless, suggest that there is substantial data about the 
linkages of radical Islamist groups operating or hiding in the region.300 Moreover, these 
authorities also underline the nexus between organized criminal activities and terrorism 
that is exploited by the terrorist groups to fund their nefarious intentions.301 Additionally, 
transnational and domestic terrorism do exist in the region and various terrorist groups 
continue to commit terrorist acts in different countries in the SEE region. 
The second group supports their argument with more objective and credible 
information. The UNODC’s World Drug Reports consistently demonstrate that the 
Balkans sit on the exact conjunction point of three different and major drug trafficking 
routes: (1) the Balkan route of heroin (from Afghanistan to Europe), (2) partially the 
Northern route of heroin (from Afghanistan to Russia and then Europe in general), (3) 
precursors and synthetic drugs from Europe to the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula.302 
Even only the illicit economy rendered by the trafficking and abuse of drug trafficking 
(almost 60% of Afghan heroin) creates significant vulnerabilities and fertile 
environments for terrorist financing. 
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The special interest and presence of radical Islamist terrorists in the region were 
also well documented. For instance, Osama bin Laden sent one of his lieutenants to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to recruit “Slavs” into the ranks of al-Qaeda.303 It is also 
reported that more than 700 Islamist militants who came to the region during the so-
called Bosnia War in the early 1990s remained in the region and gained citizenship status 
by bribing the authorities.304 Moreover, in January 2002, Bosnia turned over Bensayah 
Belkacem, convicted of being a senior al-Qaeda member, along with other five 
individuals to the United States. All of these individuals were incarcerated in 
Guantanamo by the U.S.305 
Notwithstanding the presence of radical Islamist terrorist groups, the data also 
shows that terrorism, both transnational and domestic, continues to exist in the region. 
According to the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents, 1,582 terrorist acts 
have been committed in the SELEC MS alone between 1999 and 2009. Of these 
incidents, 201 are labeled as transnational incidents and Greece (117), Turkey (60), 
Kosovo (12), and Serbia (8) are the most damaged countries from these terrorist attacks. 
As a result of these transnational terrorist attacks, 547 people were injured and 55 
individuals lost their lives. Therefore, the arguments claiming that the SEE region is not 
plagued with terrorism is quite groundless.306 
The effectiveness analysis of the CT activities of the SELEC in comparison with 
the other law enforcement cooperation activities conducted by the Center reveals that the 
CT field has been neglected or has not drawn the full attention of the MS.307 This low 
level of effectiveness can be explained by the overt or tacit involvement of politics and 
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diplomatic relations in the SELEC’s strategic and even operational levels. Especially 
during the elections of top management, diplomatic missions of the MS conduct effective 
lobbying activities and sign Agreements of Mutual Support. Aside from that, since some 
of the MS are still recovering and reconstructing their national bureaucracies, the law 
enforcement agencies have not been able to professionally detach from their political 
centers. These typical intergovernmental relation dynamics are accompanied with 
negative sentiments among some MS and lead the SELEC’s CT activities to fall prey to 
political squabbling. It also causes the SELEC to be deprived of valuable and required 
actionable intelligence and material resources to fully accomplish its objectives in terms 
of CT. 
On the other hand, there are some good indicators of transgovernmental relations 
in the SELEC. For example, the cited regional operations, the creation of the Counter 
Terrorism and Container Security Task Forces, and the specialized training programs 
with extremely limited resources can stand as proof of how peer-to-peer relations can 
yield fruitful results. 
In terms of regionalism, the SELEC can be graded with higher marks. In some 
cases, the geographic proximity enables law enforcement officers to meet in one country 
to discuss operational issues even without advance notices and travel via low-cost 
transportation vehicles.308 Additionally, cultural, ethnic, and religious affinities help to 
meet upon common grounds in many cases. The focused activities that relate, in one way 
or another, all countries in the region and the linkages of organized crime and terrorist 
groups that are scattered more than one country off the major smuggling routes also assist 
law enforcement agencies to combine their efforts.  
The most intriguing aspect of the SELEC is its role as a facilitator of integration 
with the EU and an indicator of its members’ willingness to concur their security policies 
congruent with the third pillar of the EU. Even though there are some considerable 
discrepancies on the view of terrorism in the SEE region, which is also prevalent in other 
                                                 
308 During his service in the Foreign Relations Department of the TNP, the author has witnessed that 
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regions that has suffered regional military and ethnic conflicts, the SELEC as an idea at 
least is a success and a great contributor in policy coordination activities. The SELEC 
case represents how a regional law enforcement cooperation organization can set the 
stage for concerted action in countering terrorism and draw the interests of major powers 
such as the EU and the U.S. 
The SELEC case shows that transgovernmental law enforcement structures, even 
with scarce resources and amidst political competition, are able to produce beneficial 
outcomes. The desire of the national agencies to improve their effectiveness to counter 
terrorism that emerges from a professional efficiency standpoint stimulates these national 
agencies to work together. As a transgovernmental IPCO, the SELEC developed 
practically useful mechanisms to circumvent traditional diplomatic relations in 
exchanging information. Notwithstanding that, the reliance on professional evaluation 
has led the SELEC to focus on specific areas that have not attracted much attention from 
political authorities, although they have the capacity to be exploited by terrorist groups. 
The transgovernmental structures seems to have maintained the mutual trust among 
national law enforcement agencies of which political authorities sometimes cannot get 
along well with each other. The regional setting of the agency, as in the EUROPOL case, 
has been proven to be handy in addressing the cultural, linguistic, and geographic 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 93 
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis, the author analyzed the collective efforts of police agencies at an 
international level to fight against transnational terrorism through the international law 
enforcement cooperation frameworks. INTERPOL, the UNODC, EUROPOL, and the 
SELEC were studied as the case studies. The author hypothesized that the variation of the 
effectiveness of the IPCOs can be analyzed in two dimensions: 
transgovernmental/intergovernmental relations and global/regional organization 
structures. The political detachment of the constituent police agencies from their 
respective political centers and the possession of an idiosyncratic organizational identity 
for the IPCO itself were considered as a priori conditions for operationalizing 
international law enforcement cooperation. Nevertheless, the author holds that political 
support is also important, in particular for coordinating the overall policies and pooling of 
material resources, as long as these boundaries of the involvement of politics are 
meticulously drawn and respected by the parties of cooperative action.  
Keohane and Nye argue that the transgovernmental relations among sub-state 
units can be highly effective in enhancing international cooperation in the twenty first 
century. Deflem explains the dynamics that constitute the basis of international police 
cooperation through his “Bureaucratization Theory” by stating that police agencies 
should secure their professional autonomy from their political centers to engage in 
international cooperative activities and rely on the depoliticization of their activities by 
focusing on efficiency. Raustilla suggests that the formal and informal networks 
established by police officials to cooperate internationally are the blueprint of the new 
era’s cooperation framework that fills the gaps of formal and traditional cooperation 
mechanisms. That view is supplemented by the “Culture of Badge” explained by Bayer, 
which states that idiosyncratic police collegial understanding alleviates the mistrust 
between foreign police officers. As Nadelmann advocates, these dynamics jointly lead to 
the harmonization of policies by eliminating frictions and facilitating the cooperation 
activities of different police agencies.  
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The geographic proximity dimension of the research can be grouped into two 
groups: problem-centric and solution-centric. The analysis of transnational terrorist 
attacks since 1999 reveals that more than 90% of the terrorist incidents have been 
perpetrated within one geographic region. Thus, it is safe to argue that the transnational 
terrorism problem is still a regional problem and following that logic, it can be better 
addressed in a regional context, at least at a group level. On the account of the solution-
centric dimension of regionalism, diminished time and absolute distances as well as 
linguistic, cultural, and in some case ethnic affinities can ease the cooperative action.  
When the effectiveness of the utilities offered by IPCOs was analyzed through the 
variance on the transgovernmental/intergovernmental relations axis, the author found that 
this variance had different and decisive implications on the outcomes of these utilities. 
For instance, as shown in the case studies, the transgovernmental relations in all cases 
have led to the creation of sophisticated and well-structured information exchange 
mechanisms. These mechanisms are of great importance for the constituent police 
agencies because in many cases they provide the missing link in police investigations and 
cause the terrorist organizations to lose their information advantage over law enforcement 
agencies. Notwithstanding that, these mechanisms also increase the visibility and 
admissibility of the IPCO by the lower level law enforcement officers, in particular if 
they are integrated into the national criminal databases and allow automated database 
checks. On the account of analytical work on the terrorism threat and exchanging 
processed information, the data shows that the type of structural relationship, i.e., 
transgovernmental/intergovernmental, does not have significant impacts on the volume 
and/or the quality of the output. In other terms, all four organizations have strived to 
provide quality processed information to the member law enforcement agencies. 
Nevertheless, the density and the timing on the delivery of this analytic intelligence have 
been influenced mostly by the second IV (geographic proximity) of this thesis.  
The greatest benefit of the intergovernmental settings for the IPCOs has been their 
increased outreach to the material resources and maintaining recognition in the 
international arena as a legitimate and competent actor. In almost all cases, however, 
these material resources have brought the challenge of compromising the professional 
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autonomy of the organization and depriving the ability of strategic level decision making 
from a professional standpoint. Moreover, another challenge for the IPCOs has been 
falling prey to the political squabbling between the major states and being inefficient and 
unresponsive at the times of crises. Some IPCOs, like INTERPOL, have tried to stay 
away from the abovementioned negative consequences by restraining the mandate of the 
organization as only dealing with politically insensitive or less sensitive crimes. On the 
other hand, there was another implication of the intergovernmental relations for some 
IPCOs. For example, the UNODC has opted to focus on merely capacity building and 
training activities and does not involve itself in investigative activities in order to keep 
the organization out of sensitive political discussions.  
The impacts of the structural relationship patterns on the policy coordination and 
contracting power of the IPCOs can be analyzed in two levels: strategic and operational. 
Although intergovernmental organizations enjoy the political support and guidance of the 
constituent polities and exert more authority on the sub-state agencies in the ratification 
of international conventions, the methodologies and procedures developed by the 
transgovernmental organizations have had more significant and feasible outcomes on CT. 
In other words, at the operational level, the legal frameworks and international 
agreements that follow the practical methodologies built by the practitioners have yielded 
more fruitful outcomes. Since these methods and tactics were designed to be a remedy to 
real-life problems by the experts, the constituent law enforcement agencies have 
embraced those methods and implemented them more effectively. Additionally, the 
positive outcomes of these mechanisms have incentivized the political authorities to 
adopt and formulate them in formal regulations. Especially, the JITs in the case of 
EUROPOL case and the IRTs in the case of INTERPOL which can be normally 
interpreted as a direct attack against the monopoly of states on the legitimate use of force, 
have been the outcomes of that kind of bottom-up policy coordination between different 
states.  
The analysis of these utilities of IPCOs through the second IV of this project also 
yields some good insights. First of all, the problem-centric approach on transnational 
terrorism calls for mainly regional countermeasures. A decisive majority of transnational 
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terrorist groups are operating within one or two geographic regions. Fighting against 
these terrorist groups with a network of law enforcement agencies that have the 
knowledge, experience, and shared concerns on the problems presumably would be a 
better strategy. 
From a solution-centric perspective, the data shows that the effectiveness of the 
information exchange activities carried out by the examined IPCOs increased just after 
the regional structures were established. The Fusion Task Force example in INTERPOL 
and the creation of regional centers by the UNODC and the subsequent regional 
interactions and accomplishments can be explained by the positive influence of 
regionalism. As mentioned before, information is one of most valuable assets of law 
enforcement agencies and these agencies are only willing to share this information as 
long as they feel that they will gather the same kind of information when they need it. In 
addition to that, national law enforcement agencies are highly concerned about the 
integrity and confidentiality of the information that they pool into the IPCOs. 
Maintaining these two features in a global organization is considerably difficult; 
however, a well-structured and sophisticated IPCO can fulfill these two requirements at 
the same time.  
On the account of capacity building activities, regional organizations have both 
advantages and disadvantages. The downside of the regional organizations is that they 
usually possess relatively limited material resources as opposed to global IPCOs. On the 
flip side, shared cultural values, geographic proximity, and relatively fewer linguistic 
barriers can decrease the operational costs of capacity building activities. These costs are 
great obstacles in particular for the regional organizations that are constituted by the 
third-world countries.  
In terms of policy coordination and contracting, the utilities of regional IPCOs are 
twofold: first, they facilitate the mutual or multilateral policy coordination among the 
constituent countries in a traditional sense; second, as in the case of the SELEC, they can 
serve as a facilitator and a measure of readiness on the integration of the constituent 
countries into a major political body. The problematic part for the regional IPCOs in 
fulfilling the first dimension of policy coordination activities is that in many cases law 
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enforcement agencies of the third-world countries, unlike their counterparts in Europe 
and North America, have not been able to detach from their political centers in terms of 
maintaining their professional autonomy. In these countries, the political and strategic 
level decision-making is significantly intertwined. There is a challenge to build robust 
strategic and tactical level counterterrorism policies purely from a professional 
viewpoint. The examples of this problem can be seen in the case of the SELEC. 
EUROPOL, on the other hand, seems to have overcome this problem hinging on its deep-
seated international policing experiences and adhering to the democratic governance 
methods. The well-established relations and open communication channels between the 
high level law enforcement officials and political authorities have yielded relatively 
better results in countering transnational terrorism. 
Aside from the discussed drawbacks of different IPCOs, the other challenges for 
the national law enforcement agencies are the duplication of efforts and the complicating 
structure and methodologies of international law enforcement cooperation practices. It is 
a matter of fact that each IPCO starts off to fill a gap in the realm of international law 
enforcement cooperation. Nonetheless, as shown in the mentioned case studies, they wind 
up building overlapping mandates and similar practices. The duplication of efforts results 
as the distribution of resources are allocated for international cooperative activities by the 
national law enforcement agencies. Notwithstanding that, different standards devised by 
different IPCOs complicate the national agencies’ job to keep up with the varying 
methodologies. 
The analysis reveals that regional organizations are more effective in particular on 
the operational level of cooperation, but most of the time they lack the required material 
resources or in some case know-how to build and operate sophisticated information 
exchange systems. In order to tackle these impediments, a more successful solution 
would be encouraging regional frameworks under the leadership of global and 
experienced organizations. In that regard, INTERPOL’s motto of “global cooperation 
with a regional perspective” might be a good formulation. Creation of such regional 
organizations can help the organizations to keep their invaluable intangible assets such as 
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collegial understanding and professional perspective while enabling them to efficiently 
cooperate at an international or regional level. 
Another outcome of the author’s analysis is that the tacit and to some extent, 
unpredicted implications of law enforcement cooperation on countering terrorism are 
more influential in terms of policy coordination. Formalized policy coordination 
initiatives can be perceived as political interdictions and stonewalled by the respective 
authorities; however, the same bureaucratic and political authorities may wittingly align 
their policies as the interaction and cooperative action mounts to desired outcomes.  
The well-defined relations with political circles are of great importance for 
effective law enforcement cooperation. As in the case of EUROPOL, such a close 
relation may help law enforcement agencies to project their professional view on the 
political centers. Assuming that the police agencies can conceive the problems in a better 
sense from their first-hand experiences, such a good relationship would return a higher 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
“5th Anti-Terrorism Task Force Meeting and Regional Workshop on Countering 
Terrorist Financing”. Southeast European Law Enforcement Center, July 4, 2011. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p504/04+July+2011. 
“About SELEC.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Center, 2012. 
http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About+SELEC. 
“About UNODC.” Official Website. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop. 
Adams, Thomas C. “The SECI Legacy.” In 10 years Southeast European Cooperative 
Initiative from Dayton to Brussels, edited by Erhard Busek, 184–187. Wien: 
Springer, 2006. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10187361. 
Annan, Kofi. “About UNODC”. Official Presentation, Vienna, Austria, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/About_UNODC_.pdf. 
———. Renewing The United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the 
Secretary General. New York, USA: United Nations General Assembly, July 14, 
1997. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/189/79/IMG/N9718979.pdf?OpenElement. 
———. Strengthening the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the Secretariat. Report of the 
Secretary General. New York, USA: United Nations General Assembly, July 2, 
2002. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/461/89/PDF/N0246189.pdf?OpenElement. 
Annual Reports of International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Lyon, 
France: The INTERPOL, 2010 1999. 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/Publications/default.asp. 
“Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) 
Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime”. OSCE Action against 
Terrorism Unit, n.d. http://www.osce.org/atu/24812. 
Assessment of the SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime. Final 
Assessment Report. Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, October 
14, 2004. European Union Documents. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/mar/seci-report.pdf. 
Aydinli, Ersel, and Hasan Yon. “Transgovernmentalism Meets Security: Police Liaison 
Officers, Terrorism, and Statist Transnationalism.” Governance 24, no. 1 (2011): 
55–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2010.01512.x. 
 100 
Barnett, Michael, and Liv Coleman. “Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change 
in International Organizations.” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 
pp. 593–619. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693502. 
Bayer, Michael D. The Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and 
National Intelligence. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, NDIC Press, 2010. 
http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo6214. 
Bodansky, Yossef. “Osama Bin Laden Focuses on the Balkans for the New Wave of 
Anti-Western Terrorism.” Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 31, no. 8 
(August 2003): 20. 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/197551244/fulltextPDF/136
04892FC15E3DDC9/4?accountid=12702. 
“The Bucharest Declaration on the Suppression of Terrorism and Resolution on 
Assistance to the Investigative Process Related to the Terrorist Attack in the 
United States of America”. SECI Regional Center for Combating the Transborder 
Crime, September 14, 2001. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p440/Antiterorism+Declaration. 
Bunyan, Tony. “The EUROPOL Convention”. Statewatch, 1995. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/europol1.pdf. 
Casale, David. “EU Institutional and Legal Counter-terrorism Framework.” Defence 
Against Terrorism Review 1, no. 1 (2008): 49–78. 
“Convention of the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center”. Southeast European 
Law Enforcement Center, December 9, 2009. SELEC Documents. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p514/Convention+of+the+Southeast+European+Law+
Enforcement+Center+(SELEC). 
Cortright, David. “A Critical Evaluation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Program: 
Accomplishments and Challenges”. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Transnational 
Institute, 2005. http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/crime-
docs/cortright.pdf. 
“Council Act drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (EUROPOL 




“Council Act on Drawing up a Protocol Amending the Convention on the Establishment 
of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the 
Privileges and Immunities of Europol, the Members of Its organs, the Deputy 
 101 
Directors and the Employees of Europol”. Official Journal of the European 
Communities, November 28, 2002. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/c_312/c_31220021216en00010007.pdf. 
“Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol)”. The Council of 
the European Union, April 6, 2009. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/council_decision.pdf. 
“Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and 
the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the EU to the US for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program”. The Council of the European Union, July 13, 2010. 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0003:0004:en:PDF. 
“Council Decision on the Improvement of Cooperation Between the Special Intervention 
Units of the Member States of the European Union in Crisis Situations”. Official 
Journal of the European Communities, June 23, 2008. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:210:0073:0075:EN:PD
F. 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “How Terrorism Ends - Understanding the Decline and Demise of 
Terrorist Organizations- Raw Data Download, MIPT Data”, 2009. 
http://www.howterrorismends.com/about/raw-data-downloads. 
Defining Terrorism, WP 3, Deliverable 4. Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the 
Rule of Law (TTSRL), 2008. 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf. 
Deflem, Mathieu. “Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundations of 
International Police Cooperation.” Law & Society Review 34, no. 3 (2000): pp. 
739–778. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115142. 
———. “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a 
Global Perspective.” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2006): 336–359. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/228208208?accountid=12702. 
———. “Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police 
Cooperation and Counterterrorism.” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 603, no. , Law, Society, and Democracy: Comparative 
Perspectives (2006): pp. 240–251. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097769. 
———. “International Police Cooperation Against Terrorism: INTERPOL and 
EUROPOL in Comparison.” In Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, 17–
26. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10196611&ppg=31. 
 102 
Digest of Terrorist Cases. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2010. http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf. 
“EU Agencies | Europol.” Official Website. European Police Office, 2012. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/eu-agencies-135. 
“European Council Tampere Summit- Presidency Conclusions”, October 16, 2012. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. 
“The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a More Secure 
Europe”. European Commission, November 22, 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/malmstrom/archive/internal_security_strategy_in_action_en.pdf. 
“The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy”. The Council of the European Union, 
November 30, 2005. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-
re04.en05.pdf. 
EUROPOL 2007 Annual Report. The Hague, Netherlands: European Police Office, 2008. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/annualreport2007.p
df. 
EUROPOL 2008 Annual Report. The Hague, Netherlands: European Police Office, 2009. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/annualreport2008.p
df. 
EUROPOL Review 2010 General Report on EUROPOL Activities. Luxembourg: 
European Police Office, 2011. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/en_europolreview.p
df. 
Gerspacher, Nadia. “International Police Cooperation Institutions as a Response to 
Transnational Crime: A Study of Institutional Effectiveness”. Graduate College of 
the University of Illinois at Chicago, 2002.  
———. “The History of International Police Cooperation: a 150-Year Evolution in 
Trends and Approaches.” Global Crime 9, no. 1 (2008): 169–184. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=29435067&site
=ehost-live&scope=site. 
———. “The Roles of International Police Cooperation Organizations.” European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Justice 13, no. 3 (2005): 413–434. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=sih&AN=17752124&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
“The Headquarters Agreement between Romania and The Regional Center of Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative for Combating Transborder Crime”. SECI 
 103 
Regional Center for Combating the Transborder Crime, October 2, 2000. SELEC 
Documents. http://www.secicenter.org/p161/Headquarter_agreement. 
 “History of the EUROPOL.” Official Website. European Police Office, 2012. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/history-149. 
Hurst, Jennifer. “INTERPOL - Providing Support and Assistance to Combat International 
Terrorism.” In Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, edited by H. 
Durmaz, B. Sevinc, and A. S. Yayla, 3–10. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 
2007. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10196611&ppg=31; 
ICPO-INTERPOL General Secretariat. “INTERPOL Constitution”, 1956. 
http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution. 
“International Relations | Europol.” Official Website. European Police Office, 2012. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/international-relations-31. 
INTERPOL Annual Activity Report 2004. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 
2005. http://interpol.int/content/download/771/6099/version/5/file/iaw2004.pdf. 
INTERPOL Annual Report 2007. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2008. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/768/6059/version/6/file/iaw2007.pdf. 
INTERPOL Annual Report 2008. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2009. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/767/6043/version/5/file/iaw2008.pdf. 
INTERPOL Annual Report 2009. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2010. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/766/6027/version/7/file/iaw2009.pdf. 
INTERPOL at Work 2000. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2001. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/775/6159/version/4/file/agn70r01.pdf; 
INTERPOL at Work 2001. Lyon, France: INTERPOL General Secretariat, 2002. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/774/6147/version/5/file/agn71r01.pdf; 
“INTERPOL Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files.” Official Website. 
International Criminal Police Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-
INTERPOL/Structure-and-governance/CCF/Comission-for-the-Control-of-
INTERPOL’s-Files. 
“INTERPOL Data Exchange I-link.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Data-exchange/I-
link. 




“INTERPOL Databases.” Official Website. International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012. http://interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Databases. 
“INTERPOL Executive Committee.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-
governance/Executive-Committee. 
“INTERPOL Fusion Task Force.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism/Fusion-Task-Force. 
“INTERPOL General Assembly.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/General-Assembly. 
INTERPOL General Secretariat 2002 Activity Report. Lyon, France: INTERPOL 
General Secretariat, 2003. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/773/6131/version/5/file/agn72r01.pdf; 
INTERPOL General Secretariat 2003 Activity Report. Lyon, France: INTERPOL 
General Secretariat, 2004. 
http://interpol.int/content/download/772/6115/version/5/file/agn73r01.pdf. 
“INTERPOL General Secretariat.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-
governance/General-Secretariat. 
“INTERPOL Neutrality.” Official Website. International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/Neutrality-Article-3-
of-the-Constitution. 
“INTERPOL Overview.” Official Website. International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview. 
“INTERPOL Response Teams.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Response-
teams/Deployments. 
“INTERPOL Structure and Governance.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Structure-and-
governance. 
“INTERPOL’s History.” Official Website. International Criminal Police Organization, 
2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/History. 
“INTERPOL’s Priority Crime Areas.” Official Website. International Criminal Police 
Organization, 2012. http://interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Priorities. 
 105 
Ionas, Alexandru. “SECI REgional Center for Combating Transborder Crime Keynotes”. 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, n.d. 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/SECI%20Center%20Key%20Notes%20_SP%20W
T%20III%20Meeting%20Prague.pdf. 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. “Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations.” World Politics 27, no. 1 (1974): pp. 39–62. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009925. 
Kilcullen, David J., U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Initiative., and U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Conference. “Three Pillars of 
Counterinsurgency”, 2006. 
http://www.usgcoin.org/docs1/3PillarsOfCounterinsurgency.pdf. 
Laborde, Jean-Paul, and Brigitte Strobel-Shaw. “A Review of the Counter-Terrorism 
Activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and 
Recommendations for the Way Forward.” Forum on Crime and Society 4, no. 
1&2 (December 2004): 103–100. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Forum/V05-81059_EBOOK.pdf. 
“Management | Europol.” Official Website. European Police Office, 2012. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/management-147. 
McCormick, Gordon H., Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison. “Things Fall Apart: 




“Multi-Media Law Enforcement Library Donated by FBI to SECI.” US FED News 
Service, Including US State News. Washington, D.C., November 28, 2007. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doc
view/468753985?accountid=12702. 
Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and 
History. New York: Pearson Longman, 2009. 
“Organization of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime”. United Nations 
Secretariat, March 15, 2004. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/sgb_2004_6_unodc.pdf. 
“Organizational Structure of the UNODC”. UNODC, 2010. 
http://www.unodc.org/images/about-
unodc/UNODC_Organizational_Structure_April_2010.jpg. 
“Organized Crime Threat Assessment in South East Europe - OCTA-SEE.” Official 
Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Center, 2012. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p460/OCTA+SEE. 
 106 
Ors, Huseyin. “What Are the Lessons That Can Be Learned from Turkey’s Transnational 
Operational Police Cooperation Experiences?” Rutgers The State University of 
New Jersey - Newark, 2011. 
http://hdl.rutgers.edu/1782.1/rucore10002600001.ETD.000061088 
“Overview of the SECI Center Involvement in Combating Terrorism”. UN Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), April 21, 2011. UN 
Documents. http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2011/docs/seci-center-
overview-antiterrorism.pdf. 
“Permanent Advisors.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Center, 
2012. http://www.secicenter.org/m123/Advisory_Board. 
“Plans of Action for the Implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: 
Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”. UN Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, April 15, 2002. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/497/54/PDF/N0149754.pdf?OpenElement. 
“The RAND Database of World Terrorist Incidents.” Official Website. RAND 
Corporation, 2012. http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php. 
Ratzel, Max-Peter. “EUROPOL in the Combat of International Terrorism.” In 
Understanding and Responding to Terrorism, 11–16. Amsterdam, , NLD: IOS 
Press, 2007. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10196611&ppg=31;; 
Raustiala, Kal. “The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law.” Virginia Journal of International 
Law. 43, no. 1 (2002): 1. 
“Regional Cooperation Council | Overview.” Official Website. Regional Cooperation 
Council, 2012. http://www.rcc.int/pages/6/2/overview. 
Report of the Activities of the SECI Regional Center 2002. Bucharest, Romania: SECI 
Center, 2002. http://www.secicenter.org/p219/Activity_Report_on_2002. 
Report on the First Session. ECOSOC Offical Records. New York, USA: Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, April 30, 1992. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/N94053102.pdf. 
“Results and Impact Assessments of the UNODC/TPB Activities.” Official Website. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/UNODC_Role/Results.html. 
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Todd Sandler. “The Political Economy of Transnational 
Terrorism.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 171–182. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30045106 
 107 
Sanderson, Thomas M. “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines.” 
SAIS Review XXIV, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 49–61. 
Sandler T., Arce D.G., and Enders W. “An Evaluation of Interpol’s Cooperative-Based 
Counterterrorism Linkages.” Journal of Law and Economics 54, no. 1 (2011): 79–
110. 
Schalken, Tom, and Maarten Pronk. “On Joint Investigation Teams, Europol and 
Supervision of Their Joint Actions.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & 
Criminal Justice 10, no. 1 (2002): 70–82. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=12509477&site
=ehost-live&scope=site. 
“The SECI Agreement on Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Transborder Crime”. SECI 
Regional Center for Combating the Transborder Crime, May 26, 1999. SELEC 
Documents. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p160/Legal_framework_SECI_Agreement. 
SECI Center 2003 Annual Activity Report. Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, March 
2004. http://www.secicenter.org/p220/Activity_Report_on_2003. 
SECI Center 2004 Annual Activity Report. Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, April 
2005. http://www.secicenter.org/p221/Activity_Report_on_2004. 
SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime 2005 Annual Report. 
Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, May 2006. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p222/Activity_Report_on_2005. 
SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime 2007 Annual Report. Annual 
Activity Report. Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, May 2008. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p423/Activity+Report+on+2007. 
SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime 2008 Annual Report. 
Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, 2009. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p454/Activity+Report+on+2008. 
SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime 2009 Annual Report. 
Bucharest, Romania: SECI Center, 2010. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p488/Activity+Report+on+2009. 
“SELEC Anti-Terrorism Task Force.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law 
Enforcement Center, 2012. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p263/Anti_Terrorism_Task_Force. 
“SELEC Liaison Officers and Experts.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law 
Enforcement Center, 2012. http://www.secicenter.org/p231/Pictures. 
 108 
“SELEC National Focal Points.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement 
Center, 2012. http://www.secicenter.org/p156/National_Focal_Points. 
“SELEC Observer Countries.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement 
Center, 2012. http://www.secicenter.org/p228/SECI_Observer_Countries. 
“SELEC Observer International Organizations.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law 
Enforcement Center, 2012. 
http://www.secicenter.org/p229/International_Organizations. 
“SELEC Organizational Structure.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law 
Enforcement Center, 2012. 
http://www.secicenter.org/m124/Organisation_structure. 
“SELEC Task Forces.” Official Website. Southeast Europe Law Enforcement Center, 
2012. http://www.secicenter.org/p133/Task_forces. 
Ten Years of EUROPOL 1999-2009. The Hague, Netherlands: European Police Office, 
2009. https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/anniversary-
publication.pdf. 
“The Terrorism Prevention Branch Briefing Volume 1”. UNODC Terrorism Prevention 
Branch, January 2011. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Newsletter/TPB_Briefin
g1.pdf. 
 “The Terrorism Prevention Branch Briefing Volume 2”. UNODC Terrorism Prevention 
Branch, May 2011. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Newsletter/TPB_Briefin
g2.pdf. 
“The Terrorism Prevention Branch Briefing Volume 3”. UNODC Terrorism Prevention 
Branch, August 2011. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Newsletter/TPB_Briefin
g3.pdf. 
“The Terrorism Prevention Branch Briefing Volume 4”. UNODC Terrorism Prevention 
Branch, December 2011. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Newsletter/TPB_Briefin
g4.pdf. 
“Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts”. Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, October 2, 1997. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf. 
 109 
“Treaty on European Union”. European Union, July 29, 1992. European Union 
Documents. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0068000002. 
“UN ECOSOC Resolution 155 C (VII)”. UN Economic and Social Council, August 13, 
1948. UN Documents. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/759/46/IMG/NR075946.pdf?OpenElement. 
“UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/220”. UN General Assembly, February 13, 
1998. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/767/29/PDF/N9876729.pdf?OpenElement. 
“UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Plan of Action A/RES/60/288”. UN General 
Assembly, September 20, 2006. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288. 
“UN Security Council Resolution 1373”. UN Security Council, September 28, 2001. UN 
Documents. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement. 
“United Nations Statistics Division- Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications 
(M49).” Official Website. UN Statistics Division, 2011. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 
UNODC Annual Report 2007. Annual Activity Report. Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR06_fullreport.pdf. 
UNODC Annual Report 2008. Annual Activity Report. Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR08_WEB.pdf. 
UNODC Annual Report 2009. Annual Activity Report. Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/AR09_LORES.pdf. 
UNODC Annual Report 2010. Annual Activity Report. Vienna, Austria: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/UNODC_Annual_Report_2010_Low
Res.pdf 
“UNODC Around the World.” Official Website. United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2012. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/field-offices.html?ref=menutop. 




“UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch Partnerships.” United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2012. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/partnerships.html. 
UNODC World Drug Report 2011. New York, USA: United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2011. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf. 
“UNODC/TPB Assisting States to Provide a Criminal Justice Response to Terrorism”. 
UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch, 2012. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Mandates/TPB_leaflet_general_0420
10_E.pdf. 
“Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First 
Century”. UN General Assembly, December 4, 2000. UN Documents. 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5559e.pdf. 
Woehrel, Steven. Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans. CRS Report for Congress. 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Foreign Relations Department 
 Turkish National Police 
 Ankara, Turkey 
 
4.  Department of Education 
 Turkish National Police 
 Ankara, Turkey 
 
5. Turkish Police Academy 
 Turkish National Police 
 Ankara, Turkey 
 
 
 
 
